By 328 BC, Alexander had conquered the entire Persian Empire, at least the empire that belonged to Darius III. The ancient authors gave no account as to why Alexander wanted to go beyond the Persian realm but as soon as he completed his conquests of eastern Iran, Alexander began preparations to invade India. I believe Alexander acted not so much on his desire for conquest but on his overwhelming curiosity to see what was beyond the eastern realm of the then known world. No doubt, while dealing with the mountain Indians of Eastern Iran, he had heard stories about India that did not fit with his previous knowledge of that part of the world.

Before leaving Bactra, Alexander parted with tradition and appointed Amyntas, a Macedonian, instead of a foreign satrap to secure the important satrapy of Bactria. Amyntas was left well armed with 10,000 infantry and 3,500 cavalry, more soldiers than what Alexander had started with seven years before.

In the spring of 327 BC, while his army stood at the Hindu Kush contemplating the sight of the eastern edge of the world, Alexander meticulously planned the next step of his campaign.

For the Indians, Alexander's approach through the Hindu Kush was a reminder of the long ago Aryan invasion. Nomadic Aryans invaded India around 1500 BC, destroyed the Indus valley civilization and exterminated the Indus inhabitants, thus ending the most brilliant civilization of the ancient world.

On his journey to India, Alexander brought with him his young queen Roxane, who a year later bore him a son. Unfortunately the child died soon after birth.

In early summer 327 BC, Alexander divided his army into two. The main column, commanded by Hephaestion and Perdiccas, went down the Kabul River and over the Khyber Pass to build bridges and prepare for the invasion. Alexander, meanwhile, with his lightly armed units took a different path along the Kunar Valley in east Afganistan and from there he crossed into northwestern Pakistan.

Along his journey Alexander encountered stiff opposition, which required severe fighting. The fearless Indian tribes along the mountainous terrain had numerous warriors and presented difficulties for Alexander's advance. The fighting was so severe that during the first contact both Alexander and Ptolemy were wounded.

After crossing the Swat River, Alexander encountered more formidable tribes and the fighting became even more intense. The Indians fought bravely but eventually relented. After losing Massaga, their chief fortress, the Indians left for Aornos (Pir-Sar), another fortress.

Situated at the bend of the Indus River, this 1,500-meter high fortress was impossible to scale. Sensing the limits of his army's capability, Alexander, for the time being, decided not to pursue the enemy any further. He turned his army around and marched southward down the Indus River.

Later, using different strategies, Alexander attempted to besiege the Aornos fortress several times without success. Alexander could not enter Punjab with Aornos intact. He had to break its resistance. If conventional means did not work then he had to invent new methods of attack. Of all the new methods attempted, the most successful proved to be the flooding of the ravines surrounding the fortress.

As soon as the water rose high enough in the ravine to bridge the army's position with the rock, Alexander's siege-engines moved in for the kill. The resistance soon broke and the army was able to rush in and subdue their opponents. Alexander was the first to reach the top, completing the conquest of Aornos. This was one of the most brilliant feats of strategy and tactics in his career.

With Aornos out of the way Alexander was now free to pursue his journey to Punjab. The downing of Aornos gave birth to the legend of the Macedonian supermen. The Indians regarded the fortress impregnable and believed that the god Heracles once tried to conquer it without success.

In March 326 BC, Alexander turned southward on a journey to catch up with Hephaestion and Perdiccas. When he reached them he gave his army a month of well-deserved rest. After crossing the Indus River, over the pontoon bridge previously built by Hephaestion's engineers, Alexander entered into the land of his ally Ambhi. Alexander, trusting no one, marched into Taxila battle ready but none materialized. Ambhi welcomed Alexander with many gifts and received him as his guest in the capital Taxila.

In Taxila the Macedonians, for the first time, encountered many wonders, strange manners and customs. To the scientists' delight they also discovered flora they had never seen before. It was here too that Alexander met those "naked philosophers" (Buddhist monks) and came in contact with the doctrine of Buddha.

For the next three days the Macedonians were treated royally with lavish gifts. Not to be outdone, Alexander reinstated Ambi as rajah of Taxila and showered him with gifts of his own, which included thirty horses and no less than 1,000 talents. This generosity was motivated by Alexander's wish to have Ambi on his side, as he was receiving intelligence reports of large concentrations of enemy troops ahead. In spite of making him rajah, Ambi was still a vassal king. A Macedonian military governor, with a strong garrison at his disposal actually governed Taxila.

Alexander invested a great deal of time and considerable effort negotiating peaceful terms with the other two Indian rajahs in that region but it seemed that peace was not possible before war. Porus, one of the rajahs negotiating with Alexander, made his terms very clear. If Alexander wanted his kingdom, he had to earn it in battle.

Porus's army was already amassing at the banks on the other side of the Jhelum River as more reinforcements began to arrive. Alexander could not afford to waste much time so he ordered his engineers to build a bridge. Since there were no building materials available in the vicinity, Alexander sent Coenus to dismantle the pontoon bridge from the Indus River, cut it into small sections and transport it over land on oxcarts. While Coenus was looking after the bridge, Alexander reinforced his army by adding elephants and Indian recruits to his infantry.

As he was getting ready to meet Porus Alexander did not count on a monsoon. Perhaps unaware of the Indian climate in June, Alexander led his army during continuous, steaming, torrential rain. The skies had opened up and pounded the unknowing Macedonians for over two months without a break.

Alexander traveled over the Salt Range covering about 180 kilometers in a little over two days before reaching the Jhelum River. A great achievement under monsoon conditions.

Unfortunately, the Jhelum was so swollen from the monsoon rains that it was impossible to cross. Besides, even if crossing was possible, Porus was waiting on the other side with archers, chariots and elephants. To a casual observer it would have appeared that the opposing armies had reached a stalemate. Neither could act without severe consequences.

To reinforce the idea that he was going to wait for more favourable conditions before attacking, Alexander ordered continuous supplies to be delivered to his camp in full view of his enemy. While doing that he sent surveyors up and down the river in search of a good place to cross. In the meantime, the troops were kept on full alert with activities suggesting the possibility of an imminent attack.

When nothing happened for a long time, the enemy tired of Alexander's antics and began to ignore the distracting maneuvers. As luck would have it, the surveyors did find a good place to cross. It was on a large wooded island where the channels at both sides were narrow. The spot was located about 25 kilometers upstream from camp and was ideal since there was a ravine on the near side of the bank, a good place to hide troops.

To ensure a successful crossing, Alexander had to thoroughly confuse the enemy about his real intentions so he ordered his troops to light fires over a wide area every night. At the same time Ptolemy would take a large cavalry force and run up and down the riverbank making as much noise as possible while making false attempts to cross.

Initially, all these demonstrations were taken seriously and every move and maneuver was counteracted with opposing forces on the other side. After some time, however, when it became obvious that these were only tricks to agitate the opposing troops and lower their morale, Porus began to relax his vigilance. Porus must have thought that Alexander's real aim was to break his army's morale and attack him when he was at his weakest. Unfortunately for Porus, Alexander was much cleverer than that.

Alexander had to make his move in less that two days because the other rajah, Abisares of Kashmir, was about 80 kilometers to the north and coming his way.

Even though Porus was at ease with Alexander's exercises, his patrols kept constant watch. Any attempt at crossing, even undetected, would be overwhelmed by Porus's forces as soon as it was spotted. To maximize his chances, Alexander divided his army and directed simultaneous but separate attacks at different points on the river. Not knowing where the attack was going to come from, Porus too had to divide his forces in order to counter the Macedonians. In the meantime, the pontoon bridge was assembled in secrecy and ready to be deployed.

In the dark of night, Alexander, with a force of 10,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, slipped away up the banks to make the 25-kilometer trek to attempt the crossing at dawn. The baggage train and a large part of the army remained at the base camp. Alexander had given orders to openly start making preparations for an attack at the crack of dawn. He even had one of his men, an Alexander look alike, come out of his royal tent wearing the royal cloak, barking out orders.

A second group, consisting of three battalions of the phalanx, the mercenary cavalry and infantry, was dispatched from the main camp to the halfway point between the main camp and Alexander's crossing, with orders to wait and cross only after Alexander was engaged in battle.

Craterus, in command of the forces at the main camp, was also given orders to wait and not cross until Porus had moved from his current position in pursuit of Alexander.

This was indeed a brilliant plan and certainly posed a dilemma for Porus. What was Porus to do? Porus did what any skilled commander would have done. He dispatched a strong force to stop Alexander from crossing. Alexander, however, anticipating his move countered it by depending on his best Macedonian troops to make the crossing at lightning speed and put up a great fight on the other side; a move that to this day remains unparalleled.

Alexander did receive some help from his gods who provided him with deafening thunderclaps and torrential rain, which masked the noise of the embarkation.

Even though the crossing was made successfully, all was not well. It seemed that Alexander's surveyors had made an error. The bank Alexander landed on was not the expected shore, but another elongated island. It was a long and arduous struggle to get across the fast flowing torrents of the mighty Jhelum River. Exhausted and drenched in mud the Macedonians finally made it across. Porus still did not know where the main attack was going to take place. This exhausting and pointless exercise of Alexander's he suspected was another deception to lure his forces away from the main attack. After some hesitation, however, and to be on the safe side, Porus eventually did dispatch his son with 2,000 cavalry and 120 chariots, but by then it was too late. Most of Alexander's assault force had made it across and easily subdued the Indians.

After a brief clash the Indians fled leaving behind about four hundred dead, including Porus's son. While pursuing the fleeing Indians Alexander was joined by the second group of his army, which by now had also made it across. Alexander again divided up his forces and took command of the cavalry which ran ahead at galloping speed while the foot soldiers followed behind at a fast marching pace.

When Porus received news that his son was dead and that Alexander had crossed the river, he decided it was time to face him and marched his forces upstream to do battle. Only a small force, consisting mostly of elephants, was left behind to hold back Craterus.

It is estimated that Porus had at his disposal approximately 2,000 cavalry, 20,000 infantry, 130 elephants and 180 chariots. Porus chose a level, sandy plain for the battleground and positioned his infantry in a wide central front reinforced with elephants about 30 meters apart. At the wings he positioned his chariots and cavalry along with a flanking body of infantry.

Alexander's cavalry arrived first but stayed back and would not engage the enemy until the infantry arrived. Alexander had about 11,000 Macedonian infantrymen and 6,000 cavalrymen. While waiting, Alexander kept his forces out of sight and carried out detailed reconnaissance of Porus's dispositions. A frontal attack using his cavalry would be difficult, pitting horse against elephant. The phalanx might do the trick but not while Porus's cavalry was still active. The cavalry would have to be disabled first so that there was no chance that it would outflank the phalanx.

To knock out the Indian cavalry Alexander decided to attack Porus's left wing. The idea was to keep two cavalry divisions hidden from the enemy while carrying out the attack with his entire visible cavalry, which numbered a little less that the enemy's total mounted force. A force that size was sure to overwhelm Porus's left wing and he would have to draw reinforcements from his right wing. The commander of the hidden divisions was given specific orders to circle around Porus's right wing and stay out of sight until the left wing was engaged. If Porus transferred troops from the right wing to feed the engagement, he was to charge across behind the enemy lines and attack from the rear. Otherwise he would engage the enemy normally. The phalanx was ordered to delay engagement until there was evidence that the enemy was thrown into confusion.

The mounted archers attacked first and almost immediately disabled the chariots. Alexander's cavalry charged next and, as expected, Porus committed his right wing to deliver a striking blow. The two hidden divisions, under the command of Coenus and Demetrius, broke cover and engaged the Indians from the rear. Instead of striking a blow at Alexander, Porus's cavalry received a blow and the Indians fell back to the protection of the elephants.

With the enemy cavalry put out of action, the Macedonian phalanx and heavy infantry advanced on Porus's center. But attacking angry elephants was not an easy task. Each elephant had to be encircled, its driver picked off by the archers and while the elephant fought back it had to be speared and slashed until it was brought down. The infantrymen had to resort to slashing the elephant's trunk with swords and chop at its feet with axes before the animal could be brought down. Many of those doing the hacking and chopping did not fare well either since the elephants fought back smashing, impaling, stamping and crushing their tormentors to a bloody pulp.

As Porus's battle line was pressed back, the elephants squeezed together and began to trample their own troops causing further casualties. As Alexander drew his cavalry ring tighter around Porus's army, he ordered his phalanx to lock shields and move in for the kill. By now Craterus had crossed the river and was in pursuit of those who had broken through Alexander's ring. The Macedonians had just had a traumatic experience and were in no mood for forgiveness as the battle soon turned into a massacre.

The elephants became frantic and trampled more Indians than enemies. The Indians, including Porus, fought and resisted to the bitter end. Wounded by a javelin, Porus saw no point in resisting any further and rode off on his elephant. Alexander pursued him and with diplomacy convinced him to surrender. Alexander showed great admiration for Porus and gave him the respect a king deserved. This was the last great battle the Macedonians would fight and considering that it took place under monsoon conditions, something the Macedonians had never before experienced, this may have been the most difficult battle of their entire campaign.

When it was all over, Alexander appointed Porus king of his own dominions and later extended his kingdom to the Hyphasis. Porus in turn remained loyal to Alexander until he died. To secure his position in Punjab, Alexander commissioned two new cities, Necaea and Bucephala, to be built on the Jhelum. Necaea was built where Alexander crossed the mighty Jhelum River in honour of his success. Bucephala was built where the battle took place and was dedicated to Alexander's horse Bucephalus, which was said to have died of old age.

After a month long, well-deserved rest Alexander summoned his army and headed eastward. He crossed the Chenab River which was three kilometers wide due to excessive rain. By the Chenab he founded another city which of course he named Alexandria (Sohadra). Somewhere east of the Chenab, near a city called Sangala, the Macedonians ran into stiff resistance and a horrific battle ensued where 17,000 Indians were slaughtered and 70,000 more were taken captive.

Alexander continued his eastern journey traveling below the high mountain ranges and making his way through water drenched fields in stifling heat and dripping monsoon skies. Long lines of dirty, tattered Indian refugees followed as the Macedonian army snaked its way across the countryside. After crossing the Ravi and the Beas Rivers into modern Punjab, the army camped for a short rest only to be frustrated by Alexander's future campaign plans.

It must have been some time ago that Alexander had realized that his original assumption about the geography of this region was in error. He also must have found out from the Indians that the Indus River did not empty into the Nile, as he had earlier informed his troops. Why he kept this information a secret from his troops is unknown.

Alexander waited for an opportune time to inform his troops that his maps were in error and that they were nowhere near the end of the world. In fact he informed his troops that they had to march twelve more days in the desert and cross another great river, the Ganges, before they might reach the end of the world. This information was not well received by his troops.

It appears that Alexander wanted to continue his campaign eastward and venture towards the Ganges but his giant plan was met with refusal. His army was getting tired to the point of exhaustion and would no longer follow him. They had traveled 18,000 kilometers in eight and a half years and they were tired. The sweltering weather and continuous torrential rain, which they had endured for seventy days, did not help the situation. Alexander found the predicament he was in hard to accept. Even after making many speeches and doing much sulking, his men would not relent and stood their ground. Alexander was powerless to act. After spending three days in his tent contemplating his predicament, he came to the realization that his men were right, it was time to turn back.

To commemorate his great advances and honour the gods who gave him to his victories, Alexander ordered the construction of twelve tower altars on the east side of the Beas River, one for each Macedonian god. He had his army construct the towers from square stones, which stood seventeen meters square and twenty-five meters high.

With a heavy heart Alexander turned his army around and sometime in mid September 326 BC started his march back towards his newly founded city near the Jhelum River. The next major task he would undertake would be to build a fleet of ships that would carry his army down the Indus River and into the ocean to the south.

Approximately 800 vessels were constructed to transport horses, grain, men and cargo. About 80 thirty-oar warships were built for defense. Alexander did not intend to command the fleet so he appointed Nearchus, his intimate friend from youth, as admiral.

In November 326 BC Alexander divided his army into two columns, boarded the ships and began his voyage down the Jhelum River. A blast of trumpets gave the signal to start rowing as each column took its position at opposite banks. Craterus commanded the column on the right and Hephaestion commanded the one on the left.

There was a great commotion as the pilots called out rowing commands and the oars splashed in unison, attracting onlookers who came to see the spectacle and serenade the soldiers on their voyage. Unfortunately, all was not well and before the fleet reached the Chenab, Alexander received information that a couple of tribes, the largest and most warlike, were preparing to do battle with him down river. Alexander, at the time, was not certain where the battle was going to take place so he hastened his pace down the Jhelum in hopes of passing the junction of turbulent waters where the Jhelum met the Chenab.

As it turned out, there was no sign of the enemy at the river junction but the turbulence did cause a great deal of damage and many ships were in need of repair. While repairs were made the army set camp near the banks, giving Alexander time to formulate a battle plan. The enemy territory was located between the Chenab and Ravi Rivers and a waterless desert protected their settlements. The most logical and efficient method to reach them was by water up the Chenab River. Alexander expected that the enemy too would think along the same lines so his plan included a bit of a surprise.

After his repairs were completed Alexander divided his army into three columns. He took the first column by land through the desert into the heart of enemy territory. The second column, commanded by Hephaestion, was sent up the Chenab River. The third column, commanded by Craterus, was ordered to hold the territory near the mouth of the Ravi River.

Alexander's land column encountered much resistance and a bloody battle ensued when he stormed and took several towns. Many attempted to escape but were intercepted by Hephaestion and Craterus. During the storming of one of the towns Alexander was wounded. While climbing a castle wall he fell victim to an enemy arrow which penetrated his chest. Believing him to be slain, his troops vented their fury on the enemy who fought back with equal ferocity.

Alexander was laid on his sacred shield and carried out on a stretcher to his ship. News of his alleged demise traveled like wildfire bringing grief to his troops. But Alexander was not dead and quickly regained consciousness after the arrow was extracted. In spite of all assurances, however, his men were not convinced until he himself rose to his feet, walked out of his tent and mounted a horse so that everyone could see him from the distance. Seeing their king alive brought joy to the troops whose shouts echoed throughout the land. His soldiers, from all sides, came to gaze upon him, shake his hand and show their affection. But most surprising of all was his enemy's reaction. Alexander's sudden rise from the dead spread terror and panic among the enemy ranks, causing mass surrenders. Even the enemy tribal kings voluntarily and humbly submitted themselves to Alexander's will.

After Alexander recovered from his wound, the fleet resumed its course down river until it reached the Indus where Alexander founded another city, which he named Alexandria (at the confluence).

By now it was February 325 BC and Alexander had reached the halfway point of his river voyage.

The second part of the voyage was just as turbulent as the first and even more fighting was needed before the region was conquered. Fortunately, Alexander had developed a reputation as a fierce fighter and many tribes were reluctant to fight him and acquiesced. There were others further south, however, who were influenced by the Brahmins and fought back fiercely.

After achieving victory, Alexander severely punished the Brahmins by having some of them hung for inciting riots and influencing the population to take up arms against him.

It was July 325 BC, when Alexander arrived at the Indus delta and camped for a rest at the city of Patala. Here Alexander reflected on the journey that took him from Kashmir through the entire Punjab down to the Indian Ocean. India was a great, rich and fruitful country and now she belonged to Macedonia.

While Alexander was busy conquering new land, his scientists and explorers were busy examining the country's exotic plants and animals, studying the Indian political and religious systems and cataloging the mineral wealth of this vast territory. Besides learning about India, much knowledge was imparted the other way. Being more advanced in metallurgy, the Macedonians taught the Indians how to smelt their silver and gold. The Macedonians also shared their knowledge of medicine and art, especially sculpting. Having been mislead before by geography, Alexander was determined to correct that problem as well.

During his rest at Patala Alexander and his advisors busied themselves looking for a sea passage from the Indus into the Tigris and the Euphrates. Alexander sent expeditions to explore the western and eastern branches of the Indus River delta in hopes of finding a safe passage.

It was during these expeditions that the Macedonians experienced, for the first time, the sudden and frightening ebb tide of the ocean.

After determining that the eastern branch of the Indus delta was easiest to navigate, Alexander dug wells and set up grain depots for his fleet all along the coast before returning to Patala.

By now it was nearing the end of August 325 BC and Alexander was anxious to get going. While admiral Nearchus and the fleet were ordered to wait until the end of the monsoon season, Alexander left Patala to make preparations for provisioning the fleet along the way.

On his way, Alexander ran into resistance again and had to subdue more tribes before turning westward. After appointing a Macedonian satrap to keep the region secure, Alexander left Hephaestion behind with orders to build another Alexandria city. At the coast before turning westward, Alexander left Leonnatus behind with orders to wait for the fleet and to build a second Alexandria city.

To further secure a supply line for his fleet, Alexander and his army turned westward into the Gedrosian Desert. This may have been one of the most difficult journeys Alexander and his army had ever encountered. There were no enemies to speak of only the scorching sun. Provisions, especially water, were in short supply and the army suffered immensely. Discipline, however, did not break down because the officers and Alexander himself suffered along with the men. Alexander even refused to drink water if there was not enough for everyone. His soldiers respected that and would not let him down. They traveled by night because it was too hot during the day and many perished from exhaustion, dehydration and starvation. They resorted to slaughtering their animals, including their horses, to survive. The desert was completely barren and dry and the local population subsisted strictly on seafood, consisting mostly of mussels.

It took Alexander sixty days to cross the desert before reaching Pura, the capital of Gedrosia. He marched on foot with his soldiers and shared with them his provisions as well as his courage and perseverance. He showed great respect for his men and treated them not like common soldiers but as comrades. This is the kind of man Alexander was. He always came through for his men, even in the worst of circumstances, which exemplified his true character as a person and his feelings for his Macedonians.

It is unknown how many of Alexander's people the desert took, but according to ancient sources (Arrian) a great many were lost. Even at times such as these, Alexander's scientists paused to observe and note the desert plant life.

Pura was like heaven for the survivors who, with plenty of food and drink, quickly recovered from their ordeal.

By the conquest of Gedrosia, Alexander's full subjection of Asia was complete.

It was now the beginning of December 325 BC, and Alexander was on the move again headed westward to Carmania where he had made prior arrangements to meet with Craterus. Before its departure the army was split and Craterus was sent via a different route to Carmania where he was expected to rendezvous with the main army. Craterus took the north road via the Bolan Pass and turned westward past Kandahar (Alexandria in Arachosia) where he did some fighting, before turning to Carmania. Here the field armies were again recombined and supplied with animals and provisions by the local satrap. Before leaving, Alexander held a festival of thanksgiving for his successes in India and for his passage through the deserts of Gedrosia. Here too, Alexander received news that the fleet had to depart a month earlier than expected due to the change in mood of the Indian population which had started to become hostile after Alexander's departure. According to reports, the sea voyage seemed to have had more success than the land trek with no crew losses except for some suffering due to bad food and water. With the exception of one minor skirmish, the sailors faced no armed resistance.

Like Alexander, Admiral Nearchus never bypassed an opportunity to have the scientists study the local flora and fauna, as well as record the customs of the native Indian coast dwellers. It was here too that the Macedonians saw whales for the first time. The sea voyage unfortunately was no pleasure cruise and the prolonged exposure to the hazards of the sea and lack of proper diet took its toll on the men. When they finally landed on shore and met their comrades, they were weakened, scruffy and unrecognizable. Nearchus and a few others came ahead of the fleet to report their arrival. When Alexander met them, even before a single word was exchanged, he was gripped by despair and devastated at the sight of their condition. Thinking that they were the only survivors of the fleet he wept uncontrollably. When finally Alexander gained his composure and Nearchus informed him that the fleet was safe, Alexander wept even more with joy and held a festival with offerings of thanks for its safe return.

Soon afterwards, Nearchus joined the fleet for its final voyage to Susa. Hephastion was sent by the south road to Persia to acquire provisions while Alexander, with the light troops, took the north road on a direct course to Pasargadae.

It was January 324 BC and this would be Alexander's second visit to Pasargadae. More than five years had elapsed since he had last visited this city but to Alexander it seemed like an eternity. The last time he entered Pasargadae he was a mere Macedonian general but this time he was a Great King who had outdone not just mere mortals but legendary gods. Unfortunately his accomplishments alone could not keep the peace in his empire. His prolonged absence gave the impression that he was either dead or not going to return. Thinking along the same line many of his Persian satraps, in his absence, became rebellious attacking Macedonian garrisons, plundering Macedonian temples and generally mistreating Alexander's subjects.

Alexander was now back and needed to make an example of those who had turned against him. By stern punishment he hoped to warn all others that such behavior would not be tolerated.

In one instance he executed a satrap along with his followers for usurping the title of Great King. In another, he tortured the priests in charge of a tomb that was plundered. At Persepolis Alexander had a man hanged for usurping the satrapy of a previously appointed satrap who had since died. Peucestas, a Macedonian who was comfortable with Persian customs and had learned to speak the Persian language, replaced the hanged Persian satrap.

According to Arrian, upon his return to Persepolis Alexander was saddened to tears after he gazed at the destruction he had caused the last time he was there. He was stricken with grief as he realized the symbolic value of the age-old buildings and temples that he had torched, now lost forever. He had done this for the sake of the Greeks to take vengeance for the crimes of Xerxes. Seeing the rubble and charred remains of what was once a great civilization and realizing that he had done this made him feel great remorse. The Greeks were now but a distant thought for which he cared not at all. In the last years he spent in Asia Alexander had come to the realization that here too many rich civilizations existed far beyond what he had previously imagined. The Greek idea that Asia was populated with uncultured and unworthy barbarians was only a narrow Greek concept that reflected more on the Greeks than on the Asians. The effects of his conquests did not change Alexander's character as many have claimed. What had changed was Alexander's perception of the new worlds, which he came to understand and respect.

About February 324 BC, Alexander left Persepolis and went to Susa where he was reunited with Nearchus and the fleet. Here too he had to deal with unruly satraps. Alexander had appointed Harpalus, his boyhood friend, as treasurer of Ecbatana in 330 BC. Harpalus escaped with much of Alexander's treasure and squandered it away on his own extravagant lifestyle.

During his stay in Susa, which lasted the spring and summer of 324 BC, Alexander encouraged the idea of mixed marriages. To show that he was sincere he married Stateira, Darius's daughter. He convinced some of his officers and soldiers to marry foreigners and rewarded them with gifts and dowries.

During this time Alexander also amnestied all exiles (about 20,000) in his empire, except those who were criminals, and allowed them to return to their homes. This order was begrudgingly obeyed by the Greek states. Athens especially disliked it since the majority of the 20,000 were political exiles and displaced persons from that region.

During the summer of 324 BC, Alexander left Susa for Ecbatana. He sent the bulk of his army ahead with Hephaestion on a march to the Tigris River while he and his light armed units sailed down the Eulaeus River to the Persian Gulf. After observing the scenery and satisfying his longing to sail, Alexander went up the Tigris and joined Hephaestion at Opis. Just before reaching Opis near Babylon, Alexander decided to reveal his future plans for his army's reorganization. One of his objectives, which became a bone of contention with the Macedonians, called for the retirement of the old Macedonian veterans who Alexander believed could no longer fight because of old age or debilitating wounds. His army did not take the news well, especially the idea of losing its respected veterans, and Alexander had a mutiny on his hands. Alexander's intentions may have been noble but his men did not see it that way. To some it appeared that Alexander was phasing out the conservative Macedonians only to replace them with foreigners. For some time now Alexander had been building his army with foreign recruits, mostly from Persia. The Macedonians had fought them in the past and were not happy having them among their ranks. To the conservative Macedonians it appeared that Alexander wanted to make the Persians partners and equals and that did not sit well with them.

During the mutiny harsh words were exchanged. Alexander was infuriated to the point of rounding up thirteen of the ringleaders and executing them immediately. He then dismissed the entire Macedonian army and stormed away shutting himself in his royal castle for three days, entertaining only Persians and refusing to speak to any Macedonian. On the third day some Macedonians requested an audience with him. After pleading for his time they were granted permission to see him. It was an emotional reconciliation as Alexander greeted his comrades speechless and in tears. When it was over, Alexander threw a great festival in honour of this reconciliation. As it turned out, it was not reconciliation between himself and his troops but, in the interest of the empire, it was reconciliation between the Macedonians and Persians.

At the great festival, Alexander had his Macedonians sit next to him and next to them sat the Persians and other nationalities from the empire. It was said that in all about 9,000 people of various nationalities attended. Religious ceremonies were conducted in both the Macedonian and Persian traditions without incident. This reinforces the idea that even then, as today, many cultures could live together in peace and harmony.

Alexander knew that without peace and harmony between the various people he had little or no hope of holding on to such a vast empire for any reasonable length of time. Peace and harmony however, could only be achieved through freedom and the equality of all races. This feast was a great moment for Alexander, not only because he attempted to bring reconciliation between the races but more importantly because he gave birth to multiculturalism, a concept that was well ahead of its time.

Following the festival, Alexander went ahead with his original plans and dismissed about 10,000 of his veteran soldiers. Each man, in addition to his due pay, also received an extra talent. The task of leading the veterans back to Macedonia, was given to Craterus. Upon arriving in Macedonia he was also instructed to replace Antipater. Antipater in turn was to be given orders to lead fresh troops back to Alexander.

Alexander felt that Antipater and Olympias could use a break away from each other and he himself could also use a break from their incessant complaining and bickering.

When the great festival was over, Alexander left Opis and resumed his trip to Ecbatana. After spending a few months there, he went to Babylon where he began to unfold his grand plans for the future.

From a commercial aspect Alexander revealed, via the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, a connection between the Indus, the Euphrates and the Tigris Rivers. This connection, in the future, could be exploited for trade for the benefit of the empire. Alexander was also curious as to what was on the opposite side of the Persian Gulf, in Arabia. To find out he began to organize an exploratory expedition. He was also interested in finding a quick route through Arabia to Egypt. Another curiosity of Alexander's, that had its roots back at school in Pella, was whether the Caspian Sea was an island sea or the gulf of another sea. Now that he had the means he wanted that verified as well and began to organize another discovery expedition. Yet another plan in the works was the building of 1,000 warships to be constructed in Phoenicia, Syria, Cicilia and Cyprus for future campaigns against the Carthaginians and other coastal people of the western Mediterranean. Carthage, at that time, was the most important naval and commercial power in the west. Had Alexander lived long enough to carry out his campaigns against her, the world would be a different place today.

Alexander's campaign plans against the west were based on intelligence information he had obtained beforehand about the strength of the various states and their political ties to one another. Besides military plans, Alexander had made plans for scientific exploration, constructing geographical maps, plotting ocean routes between Alexandria and Susa and developing trade routes between the various regions of his empire. Planning for world conquest was never too far from his mind but that plan Alexander only shared with his most trusted companions like Hephaestion. Unfortunately he was no longer alive. Not too long ago, while at Ecbasana during a festival, he had contracted a fatal fever and died. It was a terrible loss for Alexander and for the Macedonians. Alexander took the loss with great difficulty and mourned him for days without food or drink. Hephaestion's corpse was taken to Babylon where a great monument was erected in his honour. Also, to preserve his memory, he was never replaced as second in command next to the king. That position, forever remained vacant.

As I mentioned earlier, Alexander left Ecbatana and went to Babylon. On his way, in the middle of the winter on Mt. Zagros, he ran into resistance from a warlike tribe known as the Cossaeans who preferred to fight for their independence rather than give it up. It took Alexander forty days to subdue them and they too became part of his empire.

When it was over, he marched to Babylon and on his way he was met by Libyans, Ethiopians, Carthaginians, Lucanians, Etruscans, Romans, Iberians, Celts, dignitaries and ambassadors from all over the world. It seemed that the entire world was impressed with Alexander's achievements and wanted his friendship. Little did they know of Alexander's plans for world conquest, especially the Carthaginians who had already suffered the loss of their sister city Tyre. I still can't help but wonder what the world would have been like today had Alexander lived long enough to conquer the west.

After arriving in Babylon, Alexander's first priority was to prepare an expedition to explore Arabia. For the time being his interests in Arabia were to explore the region and gain information. He had no intention of invading the mainland. He only wanted the coastline and islands, which offered good harbours for his trading ships. As I mentioned earlier, Alexander's greatest ambition was to establish a connection by sea between Alexandria and Babylon. He was so certain his dream would become reality that he ordered the excavation of a huge harbour at Babylon. It was large enough to hold over 1,000 ships, which included his entire Asian navy and all the merchant ships in the region.

After initiating that project, Alexander became involved in the building of canals to regulate the flow of the Euphrates and the Tigris. Alexander wanted the region to prosper so he made arrangements to settle the north coast of the Persian Gulf. To promote trade on the Gulf between the mouths of the Tigris and the Euphrates he founded Alexandria Charax, a town suited by its geographical position to become a great harbour for Babylon.

While stationed at Babylon, Alexander received new recruits from various regions of his Asian Empire as well as cavalry reinforcements from Macedonia. Here for the first time Alexander started to reorganize his army to include mixed nationalities among his ranks, entrusting command positions to Macedonians. Unfortunately, Alexander's attempts to reorganize his army, along with his many other plans would not come to fruition. It has been said that on June 2, 323 BC, after participating in several festivities that lasted through the night, Alexander began to show symptoms of a fever. Some say that he may have contracted malaria, which is common during the hot summer months in the marshy areas of Babylon. Alexander was physically fit but his personal involvement in so many activities and the stress he subjected himself to during the planning and preparation of the various expeditions had weakened his strength to resist the disease. Alexander himself believed that he would recover because on June 3rd he ordered his generals to make plans to set sail on June 7th.

On the evening of June 3rd, Alexander was taken to the royal gardens on the west bank of the Euphrates for some fresh air and a speedy recovery. The next day he was feeling better and sent word for his generals to come and meet with him on June 5th. That night unfortunately his fever came back and did not leave him. On June 7th when the fleet was ready to move he ordered it to stand by, hoping that he would soon be well and able to join it. Instead of getting better he became sicker as the day progressed and by the next day he was so ill he could hardly speak.

On June 9th he called for his generals to assemble overnight in the court. The other officers waited outside in front of the gates. The next day his condition worsened and he was moved back into the palace. When his generals came to him he could recognize them but was so weak he was not able to speak a word to them. During the night and the next day his fever worsened and he was no longer able to see visitors. His troops, fearing the worst, demanded an audience with their king but the officers would not allow it. However, by threats they forced the doors open and filed past his bed in a long procession only to witness his weakened condition. Alexander with difficulty could only nod slightly and greet his companions in arms with his eyes as they filed past him in silence and deep emotion.

During the evening of June 13th, 323 BC, Alexander passed away. He was not yet thirty-three when his life was snatched away, not in a glorious battle by the enemy's sword, but by malaria, a mere microscopic parasite, a terrible way for the greatest conqueror of conquerors to die.

No one expected Alexander would die, let alone this quickly. With Hephaestion dead, there was no single leader who could step in and take charge of the empire. The leaders of the army at Babylon were suddenly faced with difficult problems. The only one who now had any authority to act was Perdiccas to whom the dying Alexander had handed his signet ring. Once more the assembly of the Macedonian army was summoned to the forefront to do its duty and elect a new king. Unfortunately, new problems arose as old traditions clashed with new ones. The wishes of the infantry, in whom the old Macedonian spirit was entrenched, could not reconcile its differences with the wishes of the more modern cavalry which was loyal to Alexander's modern ideas. Arguments came to blows before an uneasy compromise was reached where Arrhidaeus, the candidate of the infantry, was to conjointly rule with the cavalry's choice, the unborn son of Alexander and Roxane. These were indeed unfortunate choices since Arrhidaeus, Philip II's son was epileptic and dimwitted, and Alexander's child had not yet been born. Additionally, it was decided that each general was to assume responsibility for designated satrapies in accordance with the decisions reached in Babylon. Ptolemy of Lagus went to Egypt, Lysimachus went to Thrace, Antigonus went to Greater Phrygia, and Perdiccas remained in Babylon. There was one more issue placed before the assembly and that was what to do about Alexander's latest plans. Not surprisingly, the assembly unanimously decided to cancel them.

The news of Alexander's death traveled like wildfire throughout the empire but hardly caused a stir in Asia. In Greece, on the other hand, it was welcome news causing an explosion of emotions that resulted in the dissolution of the Corinthian League. Athens was the first to rise and summon the Greeks to fight against Macedonia. A new League, headed by Athens, was formed and rose up against Macedonia in what was called the "Lamian War". The Greeks could not contain their hatred for Macedonia and unleashed their fury with all their might. Unfortunately, the entire Greek might was not strong enough to overwhelm Antipater's Macedonians. Victorious, Antipater stripped Athens of her position as a power at sea and restored Samos to the Samians. He then forced a change of constitution on the Athenians, stripping them of their democratic powers. Additionally, a Macedonian garrison was installed on Athenian soil to remind the Athenians of who was in control. Antipater made peace with the rest of the insurgent states individually and dissolved their newly formed League.

Unlike Greece, with the exception of a few minor disturbances, caused mostly by disgruntled Greeks, Asia remained peaceful for a relatively long period. Unfortunately without Alexander's persuasive politics, peace slowly gave way to conflict. Even though our ancient sources fail to reveal the real motive for the conflict, I suspect it was greed for wealth and the desire to rule.

Initially it was the more ambitious satraps in Asia who fought each other for a bigger piece of their empire. Later it involved Alexander's generals who each ruled a piece of his empire but were not content with what they had and wanted more. The most powerful of these successors were Antigonus and his son Demetrius who gradually acquired most of Asia. Against them were a coalition of Ptolemy of Egypt, Seleucus of Babylon, Lysimachus of Thrace and Cassander, son of Antipater, of Macedonia.

About six years after Alexander's death, in 317 BC, a chain of events took place in Macedonia that would forever change its course in history. It began when Olympias murdered King Philip Arrhidaeus, which gave Cassander reason to vanquish her. Without Olympias's protection Cassander murdered the unhappy Roxane and young Alexander. With Alexander's family dead and no king to rule, the fate of the empire remained in the hands of his generals who were now fighting each other.

And now here is the last inscription of Dura-Europos as translated by Anthony Ambrozic.

NOTE: the letter "Š" is pronounced as "SH"

[ XXXXVII

The Cynic

Inscription on a small pedestal to the left of the entrance to the atticum of the temple of Artemis, ornamented by projecting mouldings at the upper end.

Division and Alphabetization:

GOT JE I CINIC JE ŠELE

I KOJ ŠELE I KOJ D' JEST

RAT JE GOT GYNAIKOS

Translation:

"Whoever is also a cynic is yet to be, and whosoever is yet to be and whoever already is both like to be on top of a woman."

Explanation:

GOT - "whoever, whosoever" - see GOD in passage XXXXVI supra

JE - "is"

I - "and, also"

CINIK - "cynic"

JE - "is"

ŠELE - "only then, not before"

I - "and, also"

KOJ -"who is" - KOJ is a dialectal contraction of KOJE

ŠELE - see ŠELE supra

I - "and, also"

KOJ - "who, whoever" - This KOJ is a dialectal version of the current SC. KOJI.

D' - "that, so that" - Here the dialectal D' (for the literal DA) serves as an emphasis to JEST.

JEST - "is, exists" - an archaic dialectal third prs., sing., pres. of BITI - "to be" - With D' serving to emphasize an existence that already is, JEST offers a reality counterpoint to the cynic's embryonic ŠELE.

RAT JE - "likes" - This is an idiom composed of the adv. RAD and JE to show a preference. We have seen the Venetic preference of utilizing a harder T for a softer D in several instances, the latest having been in GOT for GOD at the beginning of this and last passage.

GOJ - "on, on top of" - As in passage XVIII (GOJREJ), GOJ is the Venetic form for the gsl. GOR - "on, on top of, above."

GYNAIKOS - "woman" in Greek.

] (Pages 80-81, Anthony Ambrozic, Adieu to Brittany, a transcription and translation of Venetic passages and toponyms).

Macedonia's decline began with Demetrius's death in 229 BC. Demetrius lost his life during a valiant battle defending Macedonia against Dardanian invasions. After his death, his kingdom was left to his nine year-old son Philip. Philip unfortunately was too young to rule so guardianship was awarded to Demetrius's cousin Antogonus Doson who agreed to look after the kingdom until Philip came of age.

Antigonus Doson, sometimes referred to as Antigonus III, did his best to maintain peace and stability in keeping Philip's kingdom intact.

After Demetrius's death, while Macedonia was preoccupied with domestic affairs, Athens took the opportunity to liberate the port of Piraeus, removing the Macedonian garrison stationed there. Athens did this not by battle but by bribery. After that, Athens declared her neutrality and prudently refused to join any alliances. Sparta on the other hand, under the leadership of Cleomenes III who was unable to sit still, initiated a number of social reforms. Sparta's northern neighbours, the Achaean League, however, feared that a reformed Sparta would pose a threat to the League's dominance and took action against it. Unable to negotiate a suitable settlement, the Leagues turned to Antigonus for help. To entice him to intervene, the League offered him Acrocorinth, a strategically valuable place. Antigonus graciously accepted and with twenty thousand troops confronted Cleomenes. The mere sight of the Macedonian army marching down the Peloponnisos must have given Cleomenes's allies cold feet because they quickly withdrew leaving Cleomenes on his own.

As it turned out, Cleomenes's soldiers were mostly hired mercenaries paid for with Ptolemy's money. Ptolemy, as usual, was the instigator of these intrigues never missing an opportunity to expand his own influence. When Antigonus found this out he quickly gave Ptolemy what he wanted, territorial concessions in Asia Minor, and in exchange Ptolemy removed his support for Cleomenes. Without Ptolemy's financial support, Cleomenes lost his influence and decided to stake everything on the outcome of a single battle. In 222 BC, in Sellacia about 120 kilometers north of Sparta, Cleomenes engaged the Macedonians and lost. From there he fled to Egypt. Antigonus, meanwhile, triumphantly walked on Spartan soil as the first foreign conqueror to do so in a long time.

Victorious, Antigonus reconstituted the Hellenic League of Philip II with himself as hegemon and placed Macedonian garrisons in Acrocorinth and Orchomenos. He also left a senior Macedonian officer in charge of Peloponnesian affairs. Sparta's bid for freedom was not only lost but Sparta herself was now forced into a new confederacy with her former enemies the Achaeans, Thessalians, Epiriotes, Acarnanians, Boeotians, Phocians and worst of all, she came under Macedonian control.

Geographically, the new alliance literally encircled Aetolia, which was now an enemy of the entire confederation. The Aetolian league was not at all pleased with the new circumstances and retaliated by waging war on confederation allies.

Antigonus meanwhile, hardly given any time to enjoy his victory, had to return home to deal with another barbarian invasion. While in battle, unfortunately, he received a fatal wound from which he later died. Antigonus Doson, barely in his forties, died in the early summer of 221 BC, but not before he made arrangements to place his young nephew Philip V on the Macedonian throne.

Macedonia was not the only kingdom to have established a young king on the throne in 221 BC. Antiochus III of Asia and Ptolemy IV of Egypt were also crowned the same year.

In Asia, as I mentioned earlier, Seleucus II, coaxed by his mother Laodice, ceded Asia Minor to his brother Antiochus Hierax, something he soon came to regret. Unfortunately, neither brother was happy with the outcome and it did not take long before conflict broke out between them lasting from 239 to 236 BC.

Preoccupied with this brotherly struggle, Seleucus neglected his eastern satrapies and almost lost them. Antiochus, backed by Ptolemy III, was able to maintain pressure on his brother until Seleucus realized that this fratricidal struggle was unproductive, to say the least. In 236 BC, Seleucus made peace with Antiochus and gave him all of Asia Minor north of the Taurus Mountains. Unfortunately, Antiochus was not happy with his gains and with the help of the Galatians conspired to extort money from the surrounding city-states in Asia Minor. He even conspired to overthrow Attalus I of Pergamon.

Attalus was the son of Eumenes of Pergamon and had previous encounters with the Galatians. In fact he had won a great victory against them in 237 BC after which he proclaimed himself king. Having had experience in dealing with Galatians, Attalus was not afraid of them and went in pursuit of Antiochus chasing him through Phrygia, Lydia, Caria and beyond. During his four year pursuit from 231 to 228 BC, Attalus beat Antiochus in three major battles and took over his territories in Asia Minor. Driven out of his own domain, Antiochus, with the help of his aunt Stratonice, made a move to overthrow his brother, Seleucus. While Stratonice organized an insurrection in Antioch, Antiochus made a move against Babylonia. While this was happening Seleucus was campaigning in Parthia, which he had to abandon in order to deal with his brother. When Seleucus caught up with him he drove him out of Asia. Antiochus at this point fled to Egypt where Ptolemy imprisoned him. Soon afterwards, however, he escaped to Thrace where he was murdered by the Galatians in 227 BC.

After driving Antiochus out of Asia, Seleucus captured and executed Stratonice and was about to turn on Attalus. Before he had the chance he died from an accidental fall from his horse. In 226 BC, Seleucus II was succeeded by his first son Seleucus III Soter who held the throne for the next three years before he was murdered by his own officers while campaigning against Attalus. Upon his death, his cousin Achaeus was nominated governor of Asia Minor. He in turn in 223 BC, had Seleucus III's younger brother Antiochus III, proclaimed king. As governor of Asia Minor, Achaeus went after Attalus and by 222 BC pushed him back to Pergamon, thus recovering all the lost Seleucid territories in Asia Minor.

In Egypt, as I mentioned earlier, Ptolemy III dropped his support for Sparta and made amends with Macedonia. But in Asia, he continued to harass the Seleucids and took from them parts of the eastern Mediterranean, Thrace and the Hellespond.

After his death in 221 BC, Ptolemy III was succeeded by Ptolemy IV Philopator.

In Europe, by forming the federation, Antigonus Doson had surrounded the Aetolians. Unhappy about their predicament, they began to fight back by carrying out raids against their neighbours, the Achaean League. By now Philip V was of age and succeeded Antigonus, assuming the title hegemon. As the new hegemon he felt it was his duty to appropriately respond to the Aetolian aggression so he declared war on them. To make matters worse, news of Cleomenes's death in 219 BC inspired a Royalist coup in Sparta and an unfriendly king was appointed to the throne. The anti-federation king quickly broke off relations with Macedonia and allied himself with the Aetolians. Philip responded conclusively with speed and energy.

In the campaigns that followed, reminiscent of Alexander III, Philip V with his well trained and disciplined Macedonian army consistently outmaneuvered and outfought his opponents.

In 217 BC, however, Philip was needed elsewhere and had to wind down his campaigns so an armistice was concluded on the basis of the status quo.

In Asia, soon after his crowning, the ambitious Antiochus III revealed a grand plan to recover lost Seleucid territories and restore his great grandfather's (Seleucus I Nicator) empire. His plan included the re-acquisition of Coele-Syria down to the Egyptian Gates, the recovery of the great eastern satrapies, recovery of the Asia Minor seaports, the Hellespond and eastern Thrace on the European side. He even mounted an expedition worthy of Alexander III, which took him to Bactria and India.

Claiming that Syria and Phoenicia once belonged to Seleucus I, Antiochus launched a major offensive against Syria thus initiating the Fourth Syrian War which lasted from 219 to 217 BC. In his effort to recapture his great grandfather's empire he repossessed his old capital Selucia, the port cities of Tyre and Ptolemais-Ake and opened the road from Palestine to Egypt. Unlike Alexander III however, the more cautious Antiochus did not go conquering Egypt and instead focussed his energies on consolidating his position in Galilee and Samaria. There he spent a great deal of time negotiating peace with Ptolemy who was secretly gathering a large army for a counter attack.

Prolemy's intentions became very clear in the summer of 217 BC, when he and his younger sister Arsione showed up prepared for battle with an army of fifty-five thousand soldiers. They took to the fields of Raphia in Palestine and came face to face with Antiochus and his army of sixty-eight thousand. This was not only the biggest battle since Ipsus, but it took shape in a similar manner. Antiochus, like Demetrius before him, struck the battle line with his cavalry at lightning speed, receiving a quick victory. Unable to resist the urge to pursue his opponent, Antiochus left the battlefield, allowing Ptolemy's commanders to regroup and launch a counter attack. Without Antiochus's leadership and in the absence of cavalry support, the Seleucid phalanx broke up and was defeated. Victorious, the Ptolemies saved Egypt and cut Antiochus's ambitions short. With the exception of giving back the naval base in Seleucia, Ptolemy was happy to settle for the status quo with Coele-Syria safely back in his hands. But all was not well in Egypt. The Egyptian troops had tasted victory and wanted more, not for Ptolemy but for themselves.

A shortage of silver in Egypt forced the Ptolemies to use bronze coins, which were not very popular with the foreign mercenaries. Without foreign mercenaries, the Ptolemies had no choice but to recruit locally from the less expensive native pool of soldiers. The concentration of Egyptians in the military unfortunately stimulated a strong nationalistic sentiment, which had negative consequences for the Ptolemies. At the onset the discontentment manifested itself as sporadic outbursts of guerilla campaigns but with time it grew into an outright rebellion. In a bloody coup against the central government the Egyptians managed to free Upper Egypt from Ptolemaic control. Without the resources of Upper Egypt, the Ptolemies were forced to raise more taxes in order to maintain their state's security, thus further aggravating the situation.

While Antiochus was busy fighting the Ptolemies in Syria, his uncle Achaeus, was busy re-conquering Asia Minor for himself. Then after Antiochus lost to Ptolemy at Raphia, Achaeus made a bold move and proclaimed himself king of Asia Minor. His army, however, did not agree with his proclamation and refused to support him. In 216 BC, Antiochus returned to Asia Minor, cornered his uncle in Sardis and in 213 BC caught him trying to escape. He had him mutilated and then crucified.

For the next seven years, from 212 BC to 205 BC, Antiochus turned his attention eastward in an attempt to recover the eastern satrapies. Having first conquered Armenia he turned his attention to Media Atropatene. He invaded Media and spent two years organizing his army and raising funds to pay for his campaign. Most of the money came from the treasures of the great temple of Ecbatana. In 209 BC Antiochus III, like Alexander III before him, marched with his army eastward conquering territory after territory. Parthia fell to him without a fight and after campaigning in Bactria for two years she too fell into his hands. He crossed the Hindu Kush and signed a treaty with the Indians, after which he began his journey back via Arachosia, Drangiana, and the Persian Gulf. He also sent an expedition to conquer the Gerrhaean Arabs and won tributes of money and spices. In 205 BC, Antiochus reached Seleucia on the Tigris. There he was welcomed as a champion who had regained most of his great grandfather's empire and had restored Seleucid imperial hopes. Yet still he was not happy as Coele-Syria, the Anatolian coastal cities and the Hellespondine regions were still beyond his grasp.

The loss of Upper Egypt to the native pharaohs not only deprived the Ptolemies of substantial resources, but also brought poverty and oppression to the region. Events turned from bad to worse after Ptolemy's death in 205 BC when the Egyptian priests began to revolt against his rule. Things were no better in Alexandria either. Ptolemy V Epiphanes was still a child when Ptolemy IV died and his regency was fought over with bloody consequences. While Ptolemy IV ruled the palace was dominated mostly by women, especially Ptolemy IV's wife and sister. Now that he was gone, they too made a pitch for the throne. Arsinoe, Ptolemy IV's sister was most eager to rule but soon ran into trouble with Ptolemy's ministers who themselves were interested in his throne. To keep her from taking control, Arsinoe was murdered by two of the most powerful ministers. They in turn were later killed by an Alexandrian lynch mob. The five year-old king, meanwhile, was passed from one ambitious advisor to another. To make matters worse, Antiochus III was eyeing Egypt and, in its weakness, was preparing to invade Coele-Syria in what was later to be called the Fifth Syrian War.

In Macedonia, meanwhile, young Philip V anxious to prove himself became entangled in all kinds of Balkan intrigues. He was involved with an Illyrian pirate called Demetrius of Pharos who, at the moment, was seeking refuge in his court. Demetrius was expelled from Sicily by the Romans in 219 BC for raiding and being a nuisance to the Rhodians and Romans in both the Aegean and Adriatic Seas. Demetrius, however, was welcomed in Philip's court because he contributed troops to Antigonus Doson's Sellacian campaign. Philip also valued his so-called "sound advice".

When Rome was defeated by Hannibal in 217 BC, at Lake Trisamene, Demetrius convinced Philip to reinstall him on the Adriatic coast. Philip took his advice, moved into southern Illyria, drove out Scerdilaidas, his rival pirate and enabled Demetrius to recover his former place. Unfortunately, Scerdilaidas was not too happy about being pushed out and quickly appealed to Rome for help. Rome lost no time in sending a patrol to investigate. Anxious to avoid a showdown Philip retreated at once. He burned 120 of his own ships to avoid capture and fled with his army over the mountains. Although nothing came of this, suspicions were raised in Rome about Philip's real motives. After reaching its destination the Roman patrol remained in Illyria to safeguard against any future raids.

Another mistake young Philip made, again acting on the advice of Demetrius, was to sign a treaty with Hannibal the Carthaginian. Drafted by the Carthaginians, this treaty required Philip to become an ally of Carthage in the event of a war with Rome. In return, should Carthage win the war, she would ensure that the Romans would be forced to abandon their sphere of influence in Illyria. The only reason I believe Philip agreed to this was to humour his confidant, Demetrius. Philip at the time did not believe that Rome would risk going to war with a powerful Macedonia over a trivial document. Rome also, at the time, had no plans for any serious eastward interventions. What Philip failed to realize, however, is that his trivial actions would have serious consequences for Macedonia in the future. For the moment, however, Rome remained content and Philip continued to look for ways to gain influence in Illyria.

Still under Demetrius's influence, Philip began to look southward for adventure, always keeping one eye open for conquest. Unfortunately he continued to make mistakes. By inciting various factions in the Peloponnese to fight against one another he caused torment and senseless bloodshed. His bad influence, however, came to an abrupt end when Demetrius of Pharaos was killed in 215 BC during an unsuccessful assault on Ithome. Unfortunately, by now Philip's conquered subjects didn't see him as a reasonable ruler but as a somewhat wild, cruel and politically motivated adventurer. His ravaging of Messenia ended with Demetrius's death. For the next two years, 213 to 212 BC, Philip turned his attention to Illyria. He replaced the ships he lost during his last contact with the Romans and, being careful not to be detected, marched his army north into Scerdilaidas's territory. When the time was right he descended upon Lissos on the Adriatic and established his western base of power.

It is not known why Philip turned his attention westward at this time. His rationale may have been to put a barrier between himself and Rome or perhaps, as some believe, to gain control of the lucrative western maritime markets and trade routes in the Adriatic. In any event, his appearance in the Adriatic caused panic and hysteria in Rome. Fearing an invasion of Italy, Rome was determined to stop him and quickly sought allies among his enemies. As it turned out, the Aetolians were having problems with Philip and were also looking for allies among Philip's enemies. A Roman-Aetolian coalition not only distracted Philip from his western campaigns but also caused him to strengthen his alliance with the Achaean League. The Aetolians and Romans proved to be brutal in their habits and wreaked havoc in Illyria, Thrace, Thessaly and Acarnania. To make matters worse, Attalus of Pergamon joined the Roman-Aetolian coalition and in 209 BC was appointed general of the Aetolians.

Philip, with his disciplined Macedonian army, quickly retaliated and did well against the Aetolians on land but hesitated to challenge the Romans at sea. The Achaeans also had some success and were able to crush the Spartans at Mantinea. Before things could be settled however, both Philip and Attalus were recalled to their homeland to deal with yet another large Dardanian invasion.

After Philip left for home and was no longer a threat, the Romans lost interest in the Aetolians and abandoned them altogether. Without Rome's support, the Aetolians were no match for Philip and they quickly capitulated after his return. In 206 BC they broke their treaty with Rome and made peace with Philip, giving him back all that they had previously taken. The Romans unfortunately did not take this breakup well and were anxious for a renewed alliance. Their chance came when Rhodes and Chios started accusing the locals of disrupting international commerce with their petty wars. In the spring of 205 BC the Romans came back with thirty-five ships and eleven thousand troops. They landed in Epidamnus where Philip met them and offered them battle but the Romans refused to fight. Their real objective was to break up the Macedonian Aetolian treaty. They figured that with their massive support they could spur the Aetolians back into action, break off relations with Macedonia and wage war on Philip. When the Aetolians refused, the Romans reconsidered and negotiated separate peace agreements with the various parties involved. The result was the treaty of Phoenice which was concluded in the summer of 205 BC, thus ending the First Macedonian War.

On the surface it appeared that Macedonia was the biggest winner. Philip was allowed to keep his gains in inland Illyria. Even though the status of Lissos remained uncertain, Lissos was still under Macedonian control. Rome, on the other hand, appeared to be the loser because all she received were words of assurance that Macedonia would not interfere in Adriatic affairs. Beneath the surface however, Rome was the real winner because she managed to evade an active alliance between Macedonia and Carthage.

The conclusion of the First Macedonian War was a crossroad for both Macedonia and Rome. Philip's treaty with Rome left Philip content reassured that his problems with the Romans were over. He no longer had reason to fear the west. Similarly, Philip's word of non-interference in Roman affairs was good enough for the hysterical Roman Senators who now felt they could freely devote their full attention to dealing with Carthage. Had Philip paid heed to the growing menace west of him, he would have sided with Carthage just to maintain a balance of power. Unfortunately he allowed Rome to grow powerful. Instead of striking a crippling blow, while he still could, Philip closed his eyes and for the next five years left Rome to ravage Carthage unabated.

In Asia meanwhile, at about the same time as Philip was concluding his peace with the Romans, Antiochus III was moving towards the Hellespond by way of Asia Minor and the Aegean Sea. Philip by now must have known about Antiochus's exploits and his big ambitions to expand his great grandfather's empire and was probably anticipating an invasion. As it turned out, however, Antichus's preoccupation was not with Europe but with Coele-Syria. So, instead of attacking Philip, he made a secret pact with him to conquer and divide up Ptolemy's possessions. Surprisingly enough Philip went along with the plan and while Antiochus prepared to invade Coele-Syria, he went after Ptolemy's Aegean possessions.

Antiochus wasted no time and in 202 BC swept through Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, inflicting a crushing defeat on Ptolemy's forces. By the time he was done, he had reclaimed the port of Sidon and all coastal strongholds from Caria down to Cilicia. Then in 197 BC, he invaded the territories of Pergamon which sent Attalus running to the Romans. Egypt must have gone crying to the Romans as well, because around 199 BC Rome sent a stern warning to Philip asking him to inform Antiochus not to invade Egypt. Antiochus promptly complied since he had no intention of invading Egypt in the first place.

Here again the Macedonian monarchs underestimated Rome's importance and missed another important clue. Rome didn't care about Egypt or Ptolemy's survival. What she did care about was a healthy competition between Ptolemy and Antiochus. Put another way, Rome did not want one large consolidated Asian Empire under one ruler at her doorstep and was making sure it didn't happen.

I believe the shortsighted Macedonian monarchs preoccupied with their own petty squabbling missed the real threat lurking in the west. That eventually not only destroyed their homeland but also changed the course of history forever.

In 196 BC, blinded by his rash of victories, Antiochus crossed over the Hellespond from Asia into Europe and began to rebuild the abandoned city of Lysimachea. It was going to be a military base and a home for his son Seleucus. Unfortunately, his well-deserved reputation as a conqueror was too much for the hysterical Roman Senators. They issued him an ultimatum to stop his hostilities, relinquish the territory he had won in Asia Minor, refrain from further attacks on cities and above all keep out of Europe. Antiochus took very little notice of the ultimatum and continued his business as usual. When a Roman mission arrived in Lysimachea, delivering the Senate's earlier demands for a second time, Antiochus exclaimed that his presence in Asia Minor and Thrace was well justified because the territory was won by Seleucus I's defeat of Lysimachus in 281 BC. By rite of inheritance the territory belonged to him. Antiochus must have suspected that the ultimatum was a bluff and the Romans were in no mood to fight so he continued to rebuild Lysimachea which served as his outpost until at least 190 BC.

In 195 BC, Antiochus concluded his seven year war (Fifth Syrian War) with Egypt with a peace agreement that included his daughter's engagement to Ptolemy. Soon afterwards, in 194 BC, Ptolemy married (Antiochus's daughter) Cleopatra, sealing the deal.

In Macedonia meanwhile, after the treaty of Phoenice, Philip decided it was time to strengthen his navy and went to work building a powerful fleet. By 201 BC, his fleet was ready and operational. After his secret pact with Antiochus, Philip captured the island of Thasos, a strategic post for keeping an eye on the Bosporus and Black Sea trade routes. In 201 BC, he captured Ptolemy's naval base at Samos and added the large number of ships there to his own fleet. He later attacked and defeated the Rhodian fleet and invaded Ionia and Pergamon.

Unfortunately, the Macedonians were never good at fighting at sea but still it took the combination of Rhodes, Chios, Pergamon and Byzantium to stop the Macedonian navy. At a naval engagement near Chios, the Macedonian fleet suffered a crippling defeat, losing almost half the ships in the navy. What was most alarming about this battle was that more Macedonians were lost here than in any previous engagement on land or at sea.

Broken up by his defeat, Philip quickly withdrew to Miletus and later regrouped his forces in an enclave in Caria where he rested until 196 BC. Unfortunately his remaining fleet had to stay at sea and during the winter of 201-200 BC it was blockaded in Bargylia by the Rhodians and the Pergamenes who quickly ran to Rome to denounce Philips actions.

During the spring of 200 BC the Macedonian fleet broke free from the blockage and was back in Europe in good time to become involved in yet another war, this time between Athens and Acarnania. Being allies with the Acarnanians, Philip sent an expeditionary force to attack Athens and a squadron to capture four Athenian triremes at the port of Piraeus. The triremes however were just as easily lost as they were captured. Unbeknownst to the Macedonians, Rhodian and Pergamene squadrons were pursuing them across the Aegean and suddenly appeared from their base in Aigina, recovering the stolen ships. The Athenians were happy to have their ships back but, more importantly, were thrilled to have such friends who would come to their aid, risking the wrath of Philip. But as it turned out it was all done for political gains not for friendship. The Athenians, behind Macedonia's back, were entertaining a Roman delegation, which at the time happened to be visiting their fair city. When seventy year-old Attalus found out he couldn't wait to invite himself. Besides the prestige of being with the delegation the Athenians bestowed great honours on the old man. Athenian excitement reached its peak when Rome, Rhodes and Pergamon all pledged their support for Athens, against Macedonia.

This indeed was a moment of glory for Athens that was jubilantly celebrated with a declaration of war on Macedonia. It was an impulsive move, which unfortunately backfired. At the sight of the Macedonian army Athens lost her new friends. They had better things to do than fight for her, and left her alone to absorb the full might of the Macedonian army. Philip's reaction to the Athenian move was prompt, vigorous and characteristic of a Macedonian king, to say the least. The Macedonians did not tolerate insubordination especially from Athens. Philip dispatched general Nicanor with orders to decimate Attica, including the Academy in Athens where the Roman mission was staying. Even though no Romans were killed in the attack, in retrospect, this was a mistake. News of the savage attacks quickly reached the Roman Senate persuading the optimists that Philip's contemptuous behaviour could not be tolerated and something had to be done. The Romans felt that they had no choice but to deliver an ultimatum ordering Philip to stop his aggressions against Attica and to settle his differences with Attalus by arbitration.

Philip knew that Rome, so soon after the war with Hannibal, was in no shape to take on Macedonia. He was not in the least perturbed by the prospect of war and completely ignored the ultimatum. He ordered more attacks on Attica and also attacked the cities around the Hellespond hoping to disrupt the Athenian Black Sea grain route.

The Romans dispatched a second ultimatum, which repeated the first and added two more clauses. This time he was required to compensate Rhodes for losses as well as refrain from attacking Egypt and Egyptian possessions. My guess is that the Romans found out about the secret pact between Philip and Antiochus.

Who were these Romans anyway and how did they dare dictate terms to a superpower? Philip stood his ground and refused to be intimidated. It should have been obvious to him by now that Rome was not going to go away. In fact, after her victory in Carthage, Rome was getting bolder by the day. Philip's response to the ultimatum was very simple, if there was going to be war then the Macedonians would fight. Still unperturbed, Philip continued with his attacks until he was satisfied and then returned to Macedonia. His arrogance had finally caught up with him. His non-compliance with Roman demands and his continual harassment of his neighbours not only robbed him of his dignity as a good statesman, but also convinced the Roman Senate that he was dangerous and should be dealt with as soon as possible.

In spite of their weakened condition, due to the Roman-Carthagian Punic Wars, the Romans actually accepted Philip's war challenge. It was fall, 200 BC, when news reached Macedonia that the Roman army had already landed at Apollonia and a Roman fleet was wintering in Corcyra.

What was worse than having Rome at Macedonia's gates was the state of Philip's affairs with his neighbours. His recent rash of unwarranted attacks on his Aegean neighbours had left him with very few allies. In fact he now had more enemies eager to defect to Rome than he had allies. The Achaean League, which at the time was preoccupied fighting a war with Sparta, figured it had a better chance of winning with Rome than with Macedonia on its side. In 199 BC, the Aetolians also made their choice and joined Rome because they believed Rome would win if a war broke out. Athens too made her choice and cast her Macedonian shackles in favour of Rome. Also, as Livy puts it, "the priests, whenever they prayed for Athens and her allies, were also bidden to curse and execrate Philip, his children and kingdom, his sea and land forces, and the entire race and name of the Macedonians". (Page 309, Peter Green, Alexander to Actium The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age).

None of these actions mattered to Philip. He was confident that he could meet any challenge and win just as his ancestors had done for centuries before.

For the next two years Philip continued his business as usual and crushed the Dardanian invasion, blockaded the Romans in Illyria, and showed no mercy to the troublesome Aetolians. Unfortunately, with all his efforts, Philip could not turn the tide as he was about to meet the Romans head on. It started with the arrival of the young Roman consul, Flamininus, who was sent by the Roman Senate to meet with Philip and deliver Rome's conditions for peace. Philip agreed to a meeting, which took place at the Aoos River in Illyria, but disagreed with the Roman terms. According to Roman demands, Macedonia was to evacuate and remove all its garrisons from the cities in Thessaly, Euboea and Corinth and give the cities autonomy. In other words, Macedonia was expected to surrender all the strong positions at her doorstep. Philip was insulted by the offer and quickly stormed out of the meeting. Flamininus lost no time and began his invasion, driving the Macedonians back into Thessaly. By late summer 198 BC, the Roman legions had reached the Gulf of Coring and a battle with Philip seemed imminent. Roman presence in the region convinced all but a few Achaean League members to abandon Macedonia and ally themselves with Rome. Philip weighed the situation carefully and, in November of 198 BC, returned to the negotiating table with a counter offer which would virtually restrict him to Macedonia only. The offer was neither accepted nor rejected as the Romans kept stalling for time. It was an election year and Flamininus had to leave for Rome. Philip was told to send an embassy there and negotiations resumed. Unfortunately things did not go well. The main points of contention were Philip's insistence on retaining control of the city of Demetrias, Chalcis and Corinth, better known as the shackles of his southerly neighbours. Once Flamininus was re-elected the negotiations came to an abrupt end and the legions were on the move again. Philip, now desperate, turned to the Spartans for assistance. He offered them Argos, one of the Achaean allies who remained loyal to Macedonia, and the marriage of Philip's daughter to the Spartan king's son. The treasonous Spartans unfortunately were not trustworthy. They took Philip's offer and then stabbed him in the back by making a separate deal with Flamininus. What was worse, there was now an armistice between Sparta and the Achaean league and the Spartans were obliged to provide Flamininus with troops to fight against Macedonia. All the while the Romans and their allies were gaining strength, Macedonia's army was being reduced to about twenty-five thousand remaining troops. Philip realized that with time his strength was eroding and he had to act quickly. Like many of his predecessors he decided to stake everything on a single battle.

In June 197 BC, at Cynoscephalae in Thessaly, the unbeaten Macedonian army came face to face with the Roman legions. With a massed charge the Macedonian phalanx gave the Romans a terrifying battle that they would never forget. During the first charge the Macedonians were successful and won the first round. It was a horrific spectacle for the battle hardened Romans who for the first time had made serious contact with the Macedonian phalanx. During the second charge, unfortunately, the phalanx overreached the Roman battle line and lost formation. The Romans quickly took advantage by outflanking the phalanx and cut it to pieces. Each individual Roman soldier was equipped with tools to fight in formation and in single-handed combat, something the Macedonians had never experienced before. Unable to regroup, the phalanx fell back and was destroyed. Without the phalanx, the Romans made short work of the rest of the Macedonian army. The Romans were not only more disciplined than Philip had anticipated, but they were also fast learners and able to quickly adapt to their opponent's fighting techniques. Even though the armies were equally disciplined, the Romans proved to be more flexible, giving them the advantage they needed to win.

Victorious, Rome took control of the region, restricting Philip to Macedonia. The terms of the agreement were far stiffer than those proposed earlier. Now Philip was required to evacuate all previously held regions in Asia and Europe, with the exception of Macedonia. In addition, Macedonia was required to pay Rome a one thousand talent war indemnity. It was a hard pill to swallow for Philip but what other choice did he have?

Before I continue with the main story, I would like to take a little diversion and examine what other contributions, besides conquests, the Macedonians bestowed upon the world. Again I want to emphasize that even though Alexander's empire was split into three kingdoms, the Antogonids, the Seleucids and the Ptolemies, it was still ruled by Macedonians and was very much under Macedonian control. In spite of Alexander's attempts to integrate his Macedonian soldiers into the cultures he conquered, they resisted and after Alexander's death, they cast off their foreign robes and divorced their foreign wives thus abandoning Alexander's concept of "fusion between races in a universal empire". For a Macedonian, especially for a Macedonian soldier, there was no greater honour than being Macedonian. So why would they want to be any less?

With regard to spreading the Hellenic language and culture, I am in complete agreement with Peter Green when he says, "Hellenization, the diffusion of Greek language and culture that has been defined, ever since Droysen's Geschichte der Diadochen (1836), as the essence of Hellenistic civilization, is a phenomenon calling for careful scrutiny. Its civilizing, even its missionary aspects have been greatly exaggerated, not least by those anxious to find some moral justification for imperialism." (Page 312, Peter Green, Alexander to Actium, The Historical Evolution of the Hellenic Age).

It has never been the mission of any empire, ancient or modern, to spread its language and culture to the conquered. The cold truth is that empires seek conquest for profit and land so that they can better themselves, not those they conquer. The Macedonian imperialists were no different. Their propaganda may have claimed many things but, as history has shown, what they did was indeed very different from what they said.

The greatest contribution the Macedonians made to the world, especially to Europe, was the opening of Asia and Africa to European trade. The Macedonians made sure trade routes were created wherever they went and afterwards guaranteed their safety. Trade routes were not confined to the sea-lanes alone. Much trade was done over land and stretched from Europe to as far as the Hindu Kush. The area of trade, connected by a large grid of trade routes, was a huge rectangle that stretched from the Hellespond east to the Hindu Kush, south to the bottom of the Persian Gulf, west through Arabia to the Nile Valley and north back to the Hellespond. Trade was heavily concentrated on the Aegean side of Asia Minor and down the Nile valley. The western part of Asia Minor was the hub of economic activities both on shore and at sea.

Second to trade, the Macedonians during this period contributed a wealth of information to natural sciences, navigation, geography, biology, botany, astronomy, history and literature. It has been said that the city of Alexandria in Egypt in her glory days possessed the greatest collection of books and knowledge ever assembled in a single library. Built by Ptolemy Soter, the magnificent library of Alexandria was in possession of nearly half a million scrolls. Most of these scrolls were written in koine and were self-serving. There was very little for or about the common Egyptian, which is a contradiction to Droysen's claims regarding the Diadochoi's mission to disseminate the so-called "Hellenic Culture" to foreigners.

If anything was disseminated or shared between cultures it was technical skills. The most striking example of effective adaptation of skill was in the evolutionary techniques of warfare. Both Macedonians and foreigners learned from each other and quickly adapted to each other's fighting styles and techniques. Alexander learned about mounted archers from the nomads, a technique he adapted and employed against guerrilla attacks.

Exchange of skills was not limited to warfare. One example of effectively passing on knowledge from one culture to another was in the field of medicine. There are many examples where Macedonians taught other cultures to prepare and apply medicines to cure various illnesses.

With regard to their language, the Macedonians did spread the international koine or lingua franca, but solely for commercial, administrative and religious purposes, leaving the common men out. Back then anyone important, particularly a businessperson had to learn koine in order to interact and communicate at an international level, especially in Egypt where the Ptolemies insisted on using koine. These were exceptions, however, since the majority of the conquered populations were excluded.

It has been said that Macedonians employed local slaves, as domestics, who were taken along with them to foreign lands. While living in isolation these slaves often became accustomed to the language and culture of their masters, the Macedonians, and passed them on to their descendants. One example of this is the Jews of Alexandria in Egypt. It is believed that the first Jews to arrive in Alexandria were prisoners of war brought there by Ptolemy I. Their prolonged isolation from their own communities and the continual contact with a large Macedonian population influenced them to learn to speak the language of the Macedonians.

The cities the Macedonians built in foreign lands served multiple purposes. The port cities were gateways to maritime commerce and support centers for the Macedonian military. Other cities, such as the many Alexandrias that Alexander III commissioned and built during his conquests were there to support military needs. As I mentioned earlier, whenever Alexander encountered a hostile people he built a city and populated it with Macedonian settlers to support the needs of the Macedonian military. In time, and through further conquest, a network of Macedonian cities were built and settled with Macedonians throughout Asia and Egypt. These settlers came directly from Macedonia and brought with them their native Macedonian language, customs, skills and culture. The settlements served as military colonies and were concentrated around Lydia and Phrygia. Some were large cities serving the trade sector while others were garrison outposts spread throughout the empire serving the needs of the Macedonian troops.

Unlike any other cities, the new Macedonian cities were built on axial-grid patterns and were far larger and cosmopolitan then any previously built cities. Pergamon, Antioch, Seleucia-on-Tigris and certainly Alexandria of Egypt were vast cities and major focal points for international trade and cultural development. They were far greater than Athens ever was even at the height of her glory. That being said, one wonders why modern Europe has bestowed such great honours on Athens and almost none on Alexandria? After all Alexandria was the most important city of the so-called "Hellenistic period". Poised between Africa and Europe, Alexandria was the meeting place of all races and creeds. Still flourishing to this day, she has endured two and a half millennia of violence and survived. She is a tribute to the greatness of her builders, the Macedonians.

While on the subject of ancient Macedonian cities, I want to mention that Alexandria did not stand alone in magnificence. There were dozens of magnificent cities built after Alexander's conquests but only a few stood out. One of those few was Antioch. Antioch was built on the fertile coastal plain linking southern Anatolia with Palestine, on the left bank of the Orontes River under the towering peak of Mount Silpios. It was a site where Alexander III had previously passed by and drank water from the plentiful, cool springs. But it was Seleucus in 300 BC, who chose it for its access to the inland caravan routes, its cool breezes off the sea and for its rich surrounding lands that offered wine, grains, vegetables and oil. Like Alexandria, Antioch was an ethnically mixed city, a community of many races including retired soldiers. Antioch gained its importance when it became the capital of the Seleucid empire under Antiochus I's rule. The Ptolemy's annexed Antioch, for a brief period, but it was during Antiochus IV's rule that the city was re-developed and expanded. From 175 BC onwards its luxury began to rival that of Alexandria.

The ancient Macedonians of this period, especially those living in the Diaspora, were cosmopolitan people and freely traveled throughout their world from city to city to fight for their king, seek work or make their fortunes in trade. It was not beneath them to exchange ideas and to pass on to other cultures, their skills, customs and knowledge. Macedonian scientists, architects, engineers, artists, craftsmen and physicians traveled with the Macedonian armies wherever they went and no doubt left their mark.

With regard to education, in those days, there were no public institutions to serve the needs of the masses. Education was strictly a private affair, managed by professional tutors and only available to those who could afford it. Theater and games were also privately owned and restricted to club members only and were rarely attended by foreigners. Even the uneducated Macedonian settlers and soldiers kept to themselves and rarely socialized with those of other cultures. The Dura-Europos inscriptions, mentioned before, are good examples of such behaviour. Even after nearly three centuries of living in the Diaspora, the Macedonians of Dura-Europos still spoke their native Macedonian language and practiced their Macedonian customs.

If there was any Macedonian language and culture dissemination in the post-Alexandrian era it was to the Macedonian Diaspora of Asia and Egypt. As I mentioned earlier, Macedonians often traveled between Europe, Asia and Egypt. With them they brought news, gossip, art, music, inventions, etc., which only appealed and made sense to other Macedonians.

It has been said that a great many Macedonian settlers from Asia Minor to India, who were initially brought there to serve the military, in time, became rich land owners and built Macedonian style estates and villas, decorating them with all kinds of Macedonian art. Many of these landowners and their families remained there and practiced their customs and culture for years after the Macedonian empires collapsed. An example of this is the ancient settlement of Ai Khanum in northern Afghanistan. There, French excavator Paul Bernard and his team found a so-called "Hellenistic type" mausoleum and a villa decorated with a beautiful fountain that has carved gargoyles and water spouts in the form of lion and dolphin heads. The art and architecture is identical to that found in Macedonia. History cites many examples where ancient Macedonian cultures had survived for centuries after Macedonia proper had succumbed to Roman rule.

In terms of literature, the Macedonians were more interested in learning from the conquered than in teaching them. Being uninterested in learning the languages of the conquered, the Macedonian elite often commissioned translations of their works. Ptolemy Soter commissioned Egyptian priest Manetho to write the history of Egypt in koine. Similarly, Seleucus Nicator commissioned priest Berassos to write a digest of Babylonian wisdom, again in koine.

In terms of government, a monarch who, in theory, was a triumphant warrior, honoured truth and was accessible to his subjects, ruled the Macedonians of Macedonia proper. This was true for Macedonia but not necessarily true for Asia and Egypt, the lands won by the spear and held down by the right of conquest. The Asian and Egyptian dynasties were ruled by autocratic monarchies supported by centralized bureaucracies. There was no national power base or local ethnic support. Both Asian and Egyptian dynasties employed paid armies to maintain the status quo. Both dynasties imported Macedonians from Macedonia to administer their bureaucracies. Furthermore, the Macedonian elite maintained its rule by force and bureaucracy over a native labour force. The crown owned all lands and everything in Asia and Egypt was done in support of the king.

The difference between Macedonia proper and the other two Macedonian empires was that Macedonia proper had a national power base and Macedonians ruled Macedonians.

The study of the Macedonian identity has given rise to far greater controversies and debates than that of most, if not all, other nationilisms in eastern Europe. This has been only in part due to the hazy past of the Slavic speaking population of Macedonia and to the lack of a continuous and separate state tradition, a trait they had in common with other "small" and "young," or so-called "non-historic," peoples in the area. Controversy has been due above all to the fact that, although it began in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, Macedonian nationalism did not enjoy international acceptance or legitimacy until the Second World War, much later than was the case with other similar national movements in eastern Europe.[1] Recent research has shown that Macedonian nationalism developed, generally speaking, similarly to that of neighboring Balkan peoples, and, in most respects, of other "small" and "young" peoples of eastern, as well as some of western, Europe.

But Macedonian nationalism was belated, grew slowly and, at times, manifested confusing tendencies and orientations that were, for the most part, consequences of its protracted illegitimate status.[2]

For a half century Macedonian nationalism existed illegally. It was recognized neither by the theocratic Ottoman state nor by the two established Orthodox churches in the empire: the Patriarchist (Greek) and, after its establishment in 1870, the Exarchist (Bulgarian). Moreover neighboring Balkan nationalists-Bulgarian, Greek, Serbian-who had already achieved independence with the aid of one or more of the Great Powers, chose to deny the existence of a separate Macedonian identity; indeed they claimed Macedonia and the Macedonians as their own. They fought for Macedonia with propaganda and force, against each other and the nascent Macedonian nationalists. A prolonged struggle culminated in 1913 with the forceful partition of Macedonia after the Second Balkan or Inter-Allied War between Bulgaria, on one side, and allied Greece and Serbia, on the other.[3] Each of these three states consolidated their control over their respective parts of Macedonia, and throughout the inter-war years inaugurated and implemented policies intended to destroy any manifestations of Macedonian nationalism, patriotism or particularism- Consequently, until World War II, unlike the other nationalisms in the Balkans or in eastern Europe more generally, Macedonian nationalism developed with-out the aid of legal political, church, educational or cultural institutions. Macedonian movements not only lacked any legal infrastructure, they also were without the international sympathy, cultural aid and, most importantly, benefits of open and direct diplomatic and military support accorded other Balkan nationalisms.[4] Indeed, for an entire century Macedonian nationalism, illegal at home and illegitimate internationally, waged a precarious struggle for survival against overwhelming odds: in appearance against the Turks and the Ottoman Empire before 1913 but in actual fact, both before and after that date, against the three expansionist Balkan states and their respective patrons among the Great Powers.[5]

The denial of a Macedonian identity by the neighboring Balkan states, and their irreconcilably contradictory claims, motives, justifications and rationalizations, are mirrored by the largely polemical and tendentious Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian literature on the Macedonian question.[6] But the attitudes of the individual Great Powers and the thinking, motivations and internal foreign policy establishments have not yet been studied. In this article I will focus on the British Foreign Office and its attitude toward the Macedonian question during the inter-war years. The British Foreign Office provides a case study because Great Britain played a leading role in the area after the 1878 Treaty of San Stefano; during the inter-war years respect for national self-determination and for the rights of national minorities was, at least in theory and in official policy, the accepted and prevailing norm.

For the Macedonians the inter-war period was conditioned by the Balkan wars and the partition of their land. The peace conferences and treaties which ended the Great War, represented for many "small" and "young" nations of eastern Europe the realization of dreams of self-determination. But with some minor territorial modifications at the expense of Bulgaria, these treaties confirmed the partition of Macedonia agreed upon in the Treaty of Bucharest. For the victorious allies, especially Great Britain and France, this meant putting the Macedonian problem finally to rest. It also meant that the allies could satisfy two of their clients which were pillars of the new order in south-eastern Europe: the Kingdom of Greece and the former Kingdom of Serbia, now the dominant component in the newly created Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Yugoslavia. Even though their territorial acquisitions in Macedonia did not necessarily satisfy their max-imal aspirations, official Athens and Belgrade also pretended that Macedonia and the Macedonian problem had ceased to exist. Belgrade proclaimed Vardar Macedonia to be Old Serbia and the Macedonians Old Serbians; for Athens, Aegean Macedonia became simply northern Greece and the Slavic speaking Macedonians were considered Greeks or, at best, "Slavophone" Greeks. Although Bulgaria had enjoyed the greatest influence among the Macedonians, because of its defeat in the Inter-Allied and the Great Wars, it was accorded the smallest part, Pirin Macedonia, or the Petrich district, as it became known during the inter-war years. Unlike official Athens and Belgrade, the ruling elite in Sofia did not consider the settlement permanent; but without sympathy among the victorious Great Powers and threatened by revolutionary turmoil at home, they had to accept the settlement for the time being. In any event, the Macedonian question was not a priority for the Agrarian government of A. Stamboliski.[7] Greece, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria all sought to destroy all signs of Macedonianism through forced deportation, so-called voluntary exchanges of populations and internal transfers of the Macedonian populations. They also implemented policies of colonization, social and economic discrimination, and forced denationalization and assimilation based on total control of the edu-cational systems and of cultural and intellectual life as a whole.

These policies were particularly pursued with great determination in Yugoslavia and Greece. Though he approved of these policies, C. L. Blakeney, British Vice-Consul at Belgrade, wrote in1930:

It is very well for the outsider to say that the only way the Serb could achieve this [control of Vardar Macedonia] was by terrorism and the free and general use of the big stick. This may be true, as a matter of fact one could say that it is true ...On the other hand, however, it must be admitted that the Serb had no other choice ... He had not only to deal with the brigands but also with a population who regarded him as an invader and unwelcome foreigner and from whom he had and could expect no assistance.[8]

Ten years later, on the eve of Yugoslavia's collapse during the Second World War, it was obvious that the Serbian policies in Macedonia had failed. R.I. Campbell, British minister at Belgrade, now denounced them to Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary:

Since the occupation by Serbia in 1913 of the Macedonian districts, the Government has carried out in this area, with greater or lesser severity, a policy of suppression and assimilation. In the years following the Great War land was taken away from the inhabitants and given to Serbian colonists. Macedonians were compelled to change their names and the Government did little or nothing to assist the economic development of the country...[9]

Athens was even more extreme than Belgrade: under the guise of "voluntary" emigration they sought to expel the entire Macedonian population. Colonel A.C. Corfe, chairman of the League of Nations Mixed Commission on Greco-Bulgarian Emigration, reported in 1923: "In the course of conversation, Mr. Lambros [Governor General of Macedonia], actually said that the present was a good opportunity to get rid of the Bulgars [sic] who remained in this area and who had always been a source of trouble for Greece." [10] This could be achieved at least superficially: Athens made a concerted effort to eradicate any reminders of the centuries old Slav presence in Aegean Macedonia by replacing Slav Macedonian personal names and surnames, as well as place names, etc., by Greek. This policy reached its most extreme and tragic dimensions during the late 1930s under the dictatorship of General Metaxas when use of the Macedonian language was prohibited even in the privacy of the home to a people who knew Greek scarcely or not at all, and who in fact could not communicate properly in any other language but their own. [11] In 1944 Captain P.H. Evans, an agent of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) who spent eight months in western Aegean Macedonia as a British Liaison Officer (BLO) and station commander, condemned the Greek policies in a lengthy report for the Foreign Office. He described the attitude "even of educated GREEKS towards the SLAV minority" as "usually stupid, uninformed and brutal to a degree that makes one despair of any understanding ever being created between the two people." However, he also left no doubt that the Greek government's policies had failed:

It is predominantly a SLAV region not a GREEK one. The language of the home, and usually also of the fields, the village Street, and the market is MACEDONIAN, a SLAV language... The place names as given on the map are GREEK...; but the names which are mostly used - - - are - - - all Slav names. The GREEK ones are merely a bit of varnish put on by Metaxas... GREEK is regarded as almost a foreign language and the GREEKS are distrusted as something alien, even if not, in the full sense of the word, as foreigners. The obvious fact, almost too obvious to be stated, that the region is SLAV by nature and not GREEK cannot be overemphasized.[12]

Revisionist Bulgaria, where major trends in Macedonian nationalism were well entrenched in Pirin Macedonia and among the large Macedonian emigration to its capital, assumed a more ambiguous position. Sofia continued its traditional attitude towards all Macedonians, acting as their patron but claiming them to be Bulgarians. To a certain extent it left the Macedonians to do what they wanted; unlike Athens and Belgrade, it tolerated, or felt compelled to tolerate, the free use of the name "Macedonia" and an active Macedonian political and cultural life.[13] In its annual report on Bulgaria for 1922, the British Legation at Sofia referred to the Pirin region as "the autonomous kingdom of Macedonia" and stressed that "Bulgarian sovereignty over the district - - - is purely nominal and, such as it is, is resented by the irredentist Macedonian element no less strongly than is that of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government over the adjacent area within their frontier." [14] Indeed, it could be argued that, after the overthrow of the Stamboliski regime in June 1921, Sofia not only encouraged Macedonian discontent in all three countries but also sought to take advantage of it to further its own revisionist aims.[15] Bulgaria's revisionism split the ranks of the partitioning powers and was of great significance for the future of Macedonian nationalism. For no matter how much Greece and Yugoslavia, and their patrons among the Great Powers, especially Great Britain, pretended officially that the Macedonian question had been resolved, Bulgarian policies helped to keep it alive. [16]

More importantly still, the Macedonians, both in the large emigration in Bulgaria and at home, rejected the partition of their land and the settlement based upon it. As the British Legation at Sofia warned: "the Governments of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, if not that of Greece, are faced with practically an identical problem in the pacification and control of a district overlapping both the frontiers inhabited by a population hostile to both Governments for different reasons and determined on strengthening the hands of the opposition parties in each country."[17] Disturbing to London were calls for open resistance to foreign rule. Early in 1922 W.A.F. Erskine, the minister in Sofia, drew Lord Curzon's attention to an anonymous article in the newspaper Makedonija, purportedly from a Macedonian professor at the University of Sofia, which exhorted the Macedonians to follow the example of the Irish, who after a bitter struggle lasting through centuries, have succeeded in gaining their autonomy. "Their country is today free. Ours, too, will be free if we remain faithful to our own traditions of struggle and if we take as our example the lives of people, who, like the Irish, have "never despaired of the force of right." [18]

To be sure, organized Macedonian activity in Aegean and Vardar Macedonia, which had declined after the bloody suppression of the Ilinden uprising of 1903 and the repeated partitions of 1912-1918, came to a virtual standstill immediately after World War I. Virtually the entire Exarchist educated elite, most Macedonian activists from Aegean Macedonia and large numbers from Vardar Macedonia had been forced to emigrate and now sought refuge in Bulgaria.[19] Furthermore, the remaining Macedonian population in Aegean Macedonia, overwhelmingly rural and lacking an educated elite, found itself after the Greek-Turkish War (1919-1922) a minority in its own land as a result of the Greek government's settlement there of large numbers of Greek and other Christian refugees from Asia Minor.[20] The situation among the Macedonians in Bulgaria was only slightly more encouraging: while there were large concentrations of Exarchist educated Macedonians and Macedonian activists both in the Pirin region and in Sofia, there were deep divisions within each group. Demoralization had set in and a long process of regrouping ensued among the Macedonians there.[21]

Nonetheless, opposition to foreign rule existed in all three parts of Macedonia from its imposition and systematic anti-Macedonian policies only intensified it. That this discontent was considerable was clearly evident in the support given to the terrorist activities of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) in the 1920s. A popular revolutionary movement in the early twentieth century, by the mid-1920s IMRO had emerged as a terrorist organization. It virtually ruled Pirin Macedonia and was a state within the state of Bulgaria, pursuing its own self-saving ends by relying on Bulgarian reaction and Italian fascism, and allowing itself to be used by both. However, officially and very conspicuously-it promulgated the aims and the slogans of the older movement: "united autonomous or independent Macedonia" and "Macedonia for the Macedonians." IMRO conducted repeated, so-called "Komitaji," armed raids and incursions into Vardar and, to a lesser extent, into Aegean Macedonia until the military coup in Sofia of May 1934 when the new regime liquidated the organization. More than anything else, it succeeded in maintaining the Macedonian question on the international scene and, as champion of Macedonia and the Macedonians, it continued to enjoy considerable support throughout most of the 1920s.[22]

Widespread opposition to foreign rule is also demonstrated by the results of the first post-war elections held in Greece, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the freest to be held during the inter-war years.

Significant support in all three parts of Macedonia went to the newly formed communist parties, which also rejected the status quo and declared themselves champions of Macedonia and the Macedonians.[23] As Erskine reported from Sofia: "The program of the Communists, therefore, at the instigation of Moscow, was modified to a form of cooperation with the Macedonian revolutionaries - - - to stir up trouble generally - - - and to pave the way for a revolution by creating disorder."[24] Commenting on the election in Yugoslavia, the British minister at Sofia, R. Peel, stressed that although Serbian troops had resorted to the worst excesses in order to terrorize the inhabitants into voting for government lists, "...a large proportion of communist deputies were returned from Macedonia."[25] Clearly, the communist vote was, in effect, a Macedonian protest against foreign rule.[26] This cooperation between communists and Macedonians, dating from the end of World War I, intensified in the late 1920s and early 1930s, when the Balkan communist parties, after long and heated debates, officially recognized Macedonia as a distinct Slav nation with its own language, history and territory. The Comintern followed suit in 1934 and thus supplied the first formal international recognition of Macedonian nationalism.[27]

Both rightist and leftist activities-the renewal of terrorism by IMRO, led by I. Mihailov, and the association of Macedonian nationalism with international communism-led to a revival of the Macedonian question as the central issue dividing the Balkan states and hence as the major cause of instability in southeastern Europe. These activities not only represented rejections of the territorial and political terms agreed to at the Paris Peace Conference, but also were serious challenges to Great Britain, one of the architects of the treaty and its main defender throughout the inter-war years.

For some time following World War I, London refused to consider the unrest in Macedonia and, hence, the revival of the Macedonian question. A lengthy memorandum, "The Macedonian Question and Komitaji Activity," prepared by the Central Department of the Foreign Office in 1925, maintained that "While amongst the Slav intellectuals there is violent partisanship, probably the majority of Slavs - - - do not care to what nationality they belong."[28] DJ. Footman, the vice consul at Skopje, echoed a similar sentiment when he wrote, "I believe that 80 percent of the population merely desire a firm, just and enlightened Administration, and regard Nationalism as of minor importance." [29] If there was a problem, the explanation for it could be found in Bulgaria: London blamed Sofia not only for tolerating, but for encouraging and sponsoring an organized Macedonian movement, revolutionary organizations and armed bands on its own territory.[30] A more sophisticated explanation for the unrest could be based on a combination of social, economic and especially administrative causes: reports from the Balkans pointed to the economic backwardness of Macedonia and to the exacerbation of its economic woes by the partition, which had destroyed traditional trade routes and markets. They further stressed the lack of government reforms and constructive policies to alleviate the prevailing condition: communications remained as primitive or non-existent as they had been before the Great War, and towns such as Bitola, Skopje and Ohrid were in a state of general decline. The peasantry appeared to be slightly better off, but "this was less the result of agrarian reform or of the government colonization policy than of the energy and initiative shown by the peasantry, who have, in many cases, bought land either individually or in corporations, from Turks or Albanians who have emigrated to Anatolia."[31] "Such discontent as exists springs from genuine economic distress," wrote O.C. Harvey of the Foreign Office after a visit to Yugoslav and Greek Macedonia in April 1926: "Although the peasants are said to be doing well, the towns are dying from lack of trade. And wherever else the Serb is spending his money, he does not seem to be spending it in Macedonia. Yet this country is perhaps really the biggest problem for the Serbs." [32] Or, as R.A. Gallop, third secretary in the legation in Belgrade, put it: "What discontent there is comes from economic causes and the Government must seek palliatives. This of course will take time and cost money, but to my mind the key to the Macedonian question is now this: a prosperous Macedonia will be a contented one." [33]

But most reports to London singled out the administration as the root cause for discontent in Macedonia. The new rulers had forced on the Macedonians their own, that is foreign, administrative and legal codes ''without regard to local conditions or requirements." Their manner of administration was considered even worse:[34] it was described as invariably harsh, brutal, arbitrary and totally corrupt. As Colonel Corfe wrote: "One of the Macedonian's chief grievances is against the Greek Gendarmerie and during our tour we saw many examples of the arrogant and unsatisfactory methods of the Gendarmerie, who comandeer from the peasants whatever food they want...One visits few villages where some of the inhabitants are not in Greek prisons, without trial..."[35] DJ. Footman described the Serbian officials in Vardar Macedonia as poorly qualified, underpaid, arbitrary and corrupt. "Officials depend for their promotions and appointment on the service they can render their political party... ," he wrote. "It is therefore only natural for them to make what they can while they are in office. I regard this as the factor which will most militate against improvement in administration."[36] And, after a twelve-day motor tour in the same part of Macedonia, Major W.H. Oxley, the military attaché at Belgrade, reported: To start with they [the Prefects] have practically unlimited power over the local inhabitants and ... I gathered that they must exercise a pretty firm control. Further, we were informed that on the whole they were corrupt and were liable to use their power either to blackmail their flock or to accept bribes from over the frontiers, in order to allow terrorists to pass through their areas...[37]

The Central Department of the Foreign Office admitted all this and more. Its lengthy review of 1930 of the Macedonian question stated: At present Jugoslavia lacks the material out of which to create an efficient and honest civil service. This want is especially felt in the new and "foreign" provinces such as Serb-Macedonia. To make matters worse, the Jugoslav Government,... are compelled to pursue a policy of forcible assimilation, and, in order to "Serbise" the Slavs of Serb-Macedonia, must necessarily tend to disregard those grievances of the local inhabitants which spring from the violation of their local rights and customs.[38]

Although this authoritative statement of the Foreign Office acknowledged the existence and the seriousness of the Macedonian problem, the underlying assumption was that, once the economic and administrative causes for grievance were allayed, it would be finally resolved. But while the Foreign Office endeavored to avoid dealing with the national dimension and implications of the problem until as late as 1930, by the mid-1920s its position was already being questioned and challenged by Foreign Office officials in the Balkans, and was becoming untenable. It was difficult to reconcile the use of three different terms-Slavophone Greeks, Old Serbians and Bulgarians-when referring to a people who called themselves Makedonci and spoke Macedonian or dialects of it.[39] The British could maintain their position only as long as relations between Athens and Belgrade remained friendly; and a crisis in Greek-Yugoslav relations in the mid-1920s provoked a heated debate over the national identity of the Macedonians -Although unwillingly, the Foreign Office was also drawn into this debate and was forced to consider: "Who are the Macedonian Slavs?"

Ironically, the crisis in Greek-Yugoslav relations was sparked by the conclusion of the abortive Greek-Bulgarian Minorities Protocol of 1924, which "connoted the recognition on the part of Greece that the Slavophone inhabitants of Greek Macedonia were of Bulgarian race."[40] This infuriated the Serbs and the Belgrade government broke off its alliance with Greece on 7 November 1924; [41] it also launched a press and a diplomatic campaign that Greece protect the rights of what it called the "Serbian minority" in Aegean Macedonia.[42] The Yugoslav government clamored for a special agreement with Greece similar to the abortive protocol between Bulgaria and Greece. "The object of this move is quite patent," wrote C.H. Bateman of the Foreign Office. "All that the Serbs want is that the Greeks should recognize a Serbian minority in Greek Macedonia in the same way as they recognized a Bulgarian minority in l924."[43] In the end, even though Greece did not sign such an agreement with Yugoslavia, relations between these two countries returned to normal; but the debate concerning the national identity of the Macedonian Slavs that this crisis had instigated in the Foreign Office continued well into the 1930s.

The debate was not entirely new or confined to Britain. The national identity of the Macedonians had sparked continuous and heated controversies before the Balkan Wars and the First World War. However, the debate assumed far greater relevance and urgency after the peace settlement because all democratic governments had embraced the principle of national self-determination. This principle was supposedly the basis for the entire settlement in east central Europe; and it supposedly bound all overnments of the "New Europe" to respect the national rights of those national minorities who for one reason or another could not exercise their right to national self-determination. Hence, to a certain extent the fate of the peace settlement in this part of Europe hinged on this principle and it was thus of particular interest to Great Britain, perhaps its chief architect and defender.

Even before the Greek-Serbian dispute London had received reports that the causes for the revival of the Macedonian problem were not solely economic or administrative, but rather that they were primarily ethnic or national. While noting in its annual report on Bulgaria for 1922, that "the province known as Macedonia has, of course, no integral existence," the Chancery of the British Legation at Sofia had emphasized that as an entity it still existed "in the aspirations of men of Macedonian birth or origin scattered under the sovereignty of Yugoslavia, Greece and Bulgaria." It also had added that Macedonia has "clearly defined geographical boundaries."[44] Colonel Corfe had written in 1923 that the Macedonians of Aegean Macedonia, and incidentally in the other two parts, were fearful of state officials and had nothing to say in their presence:

But in the evenings in their own houses or when we had given the officials the slip, we encouraged them to speak to us. Then we in-variably heard the same story as "Bad administration. They want to force us to become Greeks, in language, in religion, in sentiment, in every way. We have served in the Greek army and we have fought for them: now they insult us by calling us 'damned Bulgars"' ... To my question "What do you want? An autonomous Macedonia or a Macedonia under Bulgaria?" the answer was generally the same: "We want good administration. We are Macedonians, not Greeks or Bulgars...We want to be left in peace."[45]

The Greek-Serbian crisis, however, forced the Foreign Office to concentrate its attention, as never before, on the national identity of the Macedonian Slavs and, indeed, on the question: who are the Macedonians? On 30 June 1925, DJ. Footman, the British vice consul at Skopje, the administrative center of Vardar Macedonia, addressed this issue in a lengthy report for the Foreign Office. He wrote that "the majority of the inhabitants of Southern Serbia are Orthodox Christian Macedonians, ethnologically slightly nearer to the Bulgar than to the Serb.." He acknowledged that the Macedonians were better disposed toward Bulgaria than Serbia because, as he had pointed out: the Macedonians were "ethnologically" more akin to the Bulgarians than to the Serbs; because Bulgarian propaganda in Macedonia in the time of the Turks, largely carried on through the schools, was widespread and effective; and because Macedonians at the time perceived Bulgarian culture and prestige to be higher than those of its neighbors. Moreover, large numbers of Macedonians educated in Bulgarian schools had sought refuge in Bulgaria before and especially after the partitions of 1913. "There is therefore now a large Macedonian element in Bulgaria," continued Footman, "represented in all Government Departments and occupying high positions in the army and in the civil service...." He characterized this element as "Serbophobe, [it] mostly desires the incorporation of Macedonia in Bulgaria, and generally supports the Makedonska Revolucionara [sic] Organizacija [the IMRO]." However, he also pointed to the existence of the tendency to seek an independent Macedonia with Salonica as its capital. "This movement also had adherents among the Macedonian colony in Bulgaria. It is supported by the parties of the Left in Bulgaria, and, at least theoretically, by large numbers of Macedonians."[46]

The Central Department of the Foreign Office went even further in clarifying the separate identity of the Macedonians. In a confidential survey and analysis of the entire Macedonian problem it identified the Macedonians not as Bulgarians, Greeks or Serbs, but rather as Macedonian Slavs, and, on the basis of "a fairly reliable estimate made in 1912," singled them out as by far the largest single ethnic group in Macedonia.[47] It acknowledged, as did Footman, that these Slavs spoke a language "understood by both Serbs and Bulgars, but slightly more akin to the Bulgarian tongue than to the Serbian"; and that after the 1870 establishment of the Exarchate, Bulgarian propaganda made greater inroads in Macedonia than the Serbian or Greek. However, it stressed that "While it is probable that the majority of these Slavs are, or were, pro-Bulgar, it is incorrect to refer to them as other than Macedo-Slavs. To this extent both the Serb claim that they are Southern Serbs and the Bulgarian claim that they are Bulgarians are unjustified."[48]

By declaring that the Macedonian Slavs were neither Bulgarians nor Serbs, the survey acknowledged implicitly that they were different from both and hence that they constituted a separate south Slav element. However, it did not go so far as to recognize them explicitly as a distinct nationality or nation. It sought to explain this omission by maintaining, without convincing evidence, that "while amongst the Slav intellectuals there is violent partisanship, probably the majority of Slavs... do not care to what nationality they belong."[49] The real reason for the omission, however, lay elsewhere. In view of the prevailing acceptance of the principle of national self-determination, the recognition of the Slav Macedonians as a distinct nationality would have legitimized the Macedonian claims for autonomy or at least for national minority rights. This would have connoted the tearing up or at least the revision of the peace treaties and of the frontiers, neither of which was acceptable to Britain's clients, Greece and Yugoslavia, or indeed, to Great Britain itself. "In all the circumstances the present partition of Macedonia is probably as good a practical arrangement as can be devised," declared the Central Department, "and there is no real reason or consideration of political expediency which could be quoted to necessitate a rearrangement of the present frontiers."[50]

Indeed, the Foreign Office was contemplating a different and, as it turned out, an illusory solution to the Macedonian problem. It accepted as valid the official Greek determination of the low number of Macedonians in Aegean Macedonia and assumed that with time they would be assimilated.[51] It also assumed that with time the Yugoslav hold on Vardar Macedonia would become more secure, that this would be followed "as a natural consequence" by the "rounding up of Macedonian agents," and that the Macedonian organization operating from Bulgaria would "suffer correspondingly through the lack of funds and general support forthcoming from that district...." And, as organized Macedonian activity declined, the prospect of more cordiality between Bulgaria and the Serb-Slovene-Croat kingdom will become brighter, and pro tonto, the idea of Serb-Bulgar Slav confederacy will become more feasible. The formation of such a Slav State in the Balkans will settle the Macedonian question once and for all. Other considerations arising out of the formation of such a confederacy must be reserved for the future. [52]

A few months later, on 3 March 1926; C.H. Bateman, a second secretary in the Foreign Office, issued the official position in a separate "Memorandum on 'Serbian Minorities' in Greek Macedonia."

In this strong statement he reiterated the main points of the Central Department's memorandum of 26 November 1925: "Most authorities are agreed that by all ethnological and language tests the Macedonian Slav is more akin to the Bulgar than to the Serb." Again, without substantiation, he declared that the deciding factor in the national allegiance of the Macedonian Slavs "is the national consciousness of the individual who changes his allegiance according to circumstances... His national allegiance is largely a matter of the propaganda which is exercised upon him...,"[53] in effect, under the influence of propaganda, Bulgarian, Greek or Serbian, the Macedonian Slav would become a loyal Bulgarian, Greek or Serb. Bateman therefore sided with the Greeks in the Greek-Serbian dispute: "Taking the broadest interpretation of the Macedonian Slavs, one thing is certain, namely, that the Serbs have only the flimsiest of rights to intervene at all on their behalf. The Greeks are correct in contesting this right and contending that it is a matter that touches the internal administration of Greece."[54] If, as it appears, Bateman's aim was to put an end to the Foreign Office debate concerning the Macedonian national question, he failed. Although the Greek-Serbian dispute came to nothing, this debate intensified. R.A. Gallop, third secretary of the Legation at Belgrade, spent a week in April 1926 in Vardar Macedonia; his report after the tour is most revealing:

The most striking thing to one familiar with North Serbia [Serbia proper], who has been accustomed to hear Macedonia described as Southern Serbia and its inhabitants as Serbs, was the complete difference of atmosphere which was noticeable almost as soon as we had crossed the pre-1913 frontier some miles south of Vranje. One felt as though one had entered a foreign country. Officials and officers from North Serbia seemed to feel this too, and I noticed especially in the cafes and hotels of Skopje that they formed groups by themselves and mixed little with the Macedo-Slavs. Those of the latter that I met were equally insistent on calling themselves neither Serbs nor Bulgars, but Macedonians.... There seemed to be no love lost for the Bulgars in most places. Their brutality during the war had lost them the affection even of those who before the Balkan War had been their friends...[55]

Moreover, in his response to Bateman's memorandum, Gallop defined more clearly than ever before the central issue in the Greek-Serbian dispute. He reminded Bateman that the Serbian claim is founded not on the contention that among the Slavs of Greek Macedonia there are some that can be picked as Serbs, but on the contention that the population is of exactly the same stock on both sides of the border. The Serbs see that to admit that the Macedonians in Greece are Bulgars weakens their case that the Macedonians in South Serbia are Serbs. While he agreed with Bateman "that the Macedonian Slavs used, before the days of propaganda, to call themselves 'Christians' rather than Serbs or Bulgars," Gallop did not agree "that the Macedonian Slavs are nearer akin to the Bulgar than to the Serb." In any case, he questioned the impartiality of so-called "authorities" and emphasized the actual reality that "nowadays" the Macedonian Slavs considered and called themselves "Makedonci." [56]

Oliver C. Harvey of the Foreign Office, who visited both Vardar and Aegean Macedonia, reinforced Gallop's views. Indeed, in his "Notes" on the fact-finding mission he left no doubt about the existence of a distinct Macedonian consciousness and identity. In connection with Vardar Macedonia he reported that "The Slavophone population of Serb Macedonia definitely regard themselves as distinct from the Serbs. If asked their nationality they say they are 'Macedonians,' and they speak the Macedonian dialect. Nor do they identify themselves with the Bulgars, although the latter seem undoubtedly to be regarded as nearer relatives than the Serbs."[57] As far as Aegean Macedonia was concerned, Harvey noted that in its eastern and central part "the Slavophone population had 'voluntarily' emigrated and their place had been taken by 500,000 Greek refugees" from Asia Minor. "'Voluntary' emigration," he observed, "is a euphemism; incoming Greeks were planted on the Slavophone villagers to such an extent that life was made unbearable for them and they were forced to emigrate." Such upheaval did not take place in its western part and large numbers of Slavophones remained there, in the area around and south of Florina (Lerin). "These of course constitute the much advertised "Serb minority," he continued. "But they are no more Serb than the Macedonians of Serbia-they speak Macedonian, and call themselves Macedonians and sentimentally look to Bulgaria rather than to Serbia."[58]

Through this internal debate, the Foreign Office appeared to have reached a virtual consensus that the Macedonian Slavs were neither Serbs, nor Bulgarians nor Greeks, a de facto acknowledgment that they comprised a separate southern Slav national group. But they were not given official recognition as a distinct nationality or nation; as I have already shown, the Foreign Office hoped to see the Macedonian problem disappear by their eventual assimilation into the three nations that ruled over them. In the meantime, during the second half of the 1920s and until its dissolution in 1934, the IMRO intensified its activities in Bulgaria and armed incursions into Vardar Macedonia, thereby reminding London of the Macedonian national question.

Unlike in Greece and Yugoslavia, in Bulgaria the various aspects of the Macedonian problem were generally argued freely and publicly. This was only partly due to the traditional Bulgarian paternalism toward the Macedonians; it also reflected the strength and influence of the organized Macedonian movement in the Pirin region, in Sofia and in other major urban centers. Consequently, British diplomats there were more deeply and broadly versed in all the intricacies of the Macedonian problem than their counterparts in Athens and Belgrade, and they were more apt to search for alternative solutions.

` Early in 1928 Charles ES. Dodd, the charge d'affaires at Sofia, assured the Foreign Office that the IMRO "would at once desist from its sinister activities" "if the Jugoslav Government would grant educational and religious autonomy to Macedonia." To DJ. Footman, whose reaction from Skopje had been sought by the Foreign Office, this read "like pious hope" rather than "a practical proposition." He did not reject the idea in principle; indeed, he even used the terms "nationality" and "national minority" when referring to the Macedonians, and argued that if such autonomy had been introduced immediately after the war "the results would no doubt have been beneficial." Now, however, "it would not suffice to wipe out the bitterness felt against the Serbs"; it would no longer satisfy the entire Macedonian movement. Instead, he warned, Macedonian activists would interpret it "as a confession of failure and a sign of weakness on the part of Serbs, to be exploited to the utmost possible extent." He considered (and the future proved him right) that "the best chance for real progress in Macedonia" was "the removal of the Serb predominance in the Jugoslav state."[59] The Foreign Office dismissed Dodd's suggestion and showed little appreciation of Footman's pessimistic, but rather sensitive and measured analysis of the Macedonian problem in Yugoslavia. "It is quite clear, however," wrote Orme Sargent, a counselor and a future assistant under secretary of state, "that it would be impossible to expect the Jugoslav Government to adopt measures which would recognize the population of Southern Serbia as a political minority." Inasmuch as he had convinced himself that the discontent in Macedonia was "due to economic and administrative conditions rather than psychological or racial issues," he endorsed instead a proposal made by H.W. Kennard, the minister at Belgrade, to grant financial loans to Yugoslavia to improve internal conditions "in Southern Serbia and thus help to lessen the present sullen discontent of the population." Most important, such expenditure, Sargent concluded, would not have the appearance of being extorted from the Jugoslav Government at the point of the Macedonian bayonet, nor would it commit the Jugoslavs in any way to a recognition of the claim of a separate Macedonian nationality. Reforms on these lines could therefore be carried out at any time without loss of face by the Jugoslav Government. [60]

Obviously Sargent was concerned with the sensitivities and interests of the Yugoslav government and not with the demands of the Macedonians and consciously sought to minimize "the psychological and racial issues" as the basis of Macedonian discontent. This did not go unnoticed at the British Legation at Sofia: in a rather blunt and less than diplomatic manner, R.A.C. Sperling, the new minister at Sofia, accused the "Powers," meaning, of course, primarily his own government and that of France, of always unfairly taking the side of Yugoslavia against Bulgaria and the Macedonians. Or as he put it, "Jugoslavia continues flagrantly to violate the provisions of the Minorities Treaty of 1919. The Powers as well as the League of Nations accept any quibble advanced by the Jugoslav Government as a pretext for not raising the question of the Macedonian minority."[61]

The exchange of views provoked by Sperling's "outburst," as O. Sargent called it, is most revealing about the Foreign Office's thinking on the Macedonian national question. Howard Kennard, Sperling's counterpart at Belgrade, was so taken aback by it that he did not wish to comment on it officially. In a letter to 0. Sargent, however, he expressed his "private regrets that Sperling cannot understand that it is not a question of taking sides one way or the other, but of assisting in preserving the peace in the Balkans, which is, after all, our only political raison d'etre here."[62] C.H. Bateman accused Sperling of holding general views "that are not only erroneous but certainly dangerous ...His Majesty's Government has long since decided that what are nebulously called Macedonian aspirations are impossible of realization, and that to give way to Macedonian agitation would be the best way to create upheaval in the Balkans." [63] Sargent felt that Sperling's "outburst" ought not to go unnoticed; but instead of an official reprimand he proposed to send him a private letter.[64] This was approved by R.G. Vansittart, private secretary to the Prime Minister and assistant under secretary of state in the Foreign Office, who added that "the next time this sort of thing happens, he [Sperling] should have it officially."[65] Sargent's lengthy private letter was polite, but direct. He pointed out that Serbia was the signatory "of one minorities treaty," that signed at St. Germain on 20 September 1919. "In your dispatch you make mention of a Macedonian minority. But what is this minority?" he asked. "You will find no mention of it in the Jugoslav Minorities Treaty... He also reiterated the well known view of the Foreign Office that the grievances which "the population of Southern Serbia complain of are common to all and are due to the general low level of administrative ability among the local officials and not to the intentional ill treatment of any particular race, sect or language." Finally, he rejected Sperling's suggestion that some satisfaction of the "Macedonian national aspirations" might lead to a solution of the Macedonian problem. "What are we to understand by such aspirations?" asked Sargent. "If Macedonian autonomy is what is aimed at it can be said at once that it is impossible of realisation." To aim at it would be to play into the hands of Italy and other revisionist elements, and Britain was determined "to stick strenuously to the peace terms."[66]

Sperling was not deterred by the hostile reaction of his superiors. He responded to Sargent with a lengthy letter of his own in which he reduced the Macedonian problem to its bare essentials by asking bluntly two questions: "a, Is there such a thing as a Macedonian minority?" and "b, If there is, is it ill treated by the Serbs?" He then went on to answer them. "Sounds superfluous," he wrote, "but you ask 'What is the Macedonian minority?' I can hardly believe you want me to quote all the authorities from the year one to show you that there is such a thing as a Macedonian." He referred him specifically to the earlier reports by Gallop, Harvey and Footman, and stressed that the Slav inhabitants of Macedonia called themselves neither Serbs nor Bulgarians, but Macedonians. With regard to the second question, Sperling argued that it made no difference to the Macedonians "whether these things were due, as you say, to the general low level of Serbian administrative ability or to the intentional ill treatment of a particular race. ... The fact remains that their charges stand..."[67]

London was not prepared to listen and, indeed, wished to put an end to the expression of views that seemed to run counter to the main tenets of Britain's policies in southeastern Europe. C.H. Bateman suggested to Sargent that "a short reply would be sufficient to point to the confusion of thought which appears to exist at our legation at Sofia on this Macedonian question."[68] Otherwise, his comments, which were drafted by Sargent into a letter to Sperling, reveal a characteristic British slighting of nationalism and national movements among the so-called "small" and "young" peoples in eastern Europe. He argued that just because the Slavs of Macedonia called themselves Macedonians, "there was no reason why We or you should consent to give them a name which coincides with a piece of territory... which has not for a thousand years been an autonomous entity in any sense..."[69] However, he could not come up with another, more acceptable name for them, except perhaps "Macedo-Slavs," which was in effect the same thing.[70]

Such intervention and argumeilts do not seem to have been sufficient to silence the legation at Sofia. At any rate, R.A.C. Sperling left Sofia shortly after,[71] and his successor-, Sidney P.P. Waterlow, held views on the Macedonian problem that were, if anything, even more revisionist. He expressed them most cogently in a long, thoughtful and courteous letter to R.G. Vansittart,[72] who had in the meantime become permanent under secretary of state for foreign affairs. He did not believe, as the Foreign Office did, that the Macedonian problem would simply disappear when the militant revolutionaries had been destroyed in Bulgaria and when Yugoslavia had provided the Macedonians with good administration and a civilized minority regime. Unlike Nevile Henderson, Kennard's successor as minister at Belgrade, he could not see how any amount of good administration, even if it would improve the atmosphere and facilitate the suppression of the IMRO, could be an ultimate solution. He argued that only genuine home rule-freedom to manage local affairs, churches, schools, etc.-could do that, but even here he had doubts. In any case, he seemed convinced that Belgrade was not capable of giving its Macedonian subjects anything like real local autonomy or, at least, not so long as the Macedonians considered themselves Macedonian.

It is this that dictates the present policy of intense Serbification. But it is this that makes it impossible to introduce a genuine minority regime until there is no minority to give the regime to, and it is just this that Bulgaria, with her Macedonian exiles (the most stubborn and intelligent people in the Balkans) and her indigenous Macedonian population, can never wholeheartedly accept ...[73]

Thus, even if the revolutionaries were destroyed and Serbian Macedonia was ruled with "kindly wisdom," the Macedonian question would most likely remain unresolved, an apple of discord, a stumbling block to stability in the Balkans, etc. In Waterlow's search for a solution "that might bring real peace at long last," he seriously considered the idea, which seemed entirely logical to him but at the same time not altogether practical from the perspective of British foreign policy, of an autonomous united Macedonia. "I do not share the view of the department that Macedonia never having been a geographical or racial entity, the idea [an autonomous united Macedonia] is inherently absurd;" he wrote, "that is an exaggeration, inherited, I fancy, from the predominance of Serb views at the Peace Conference." He believed that, united and independent, the Macedonians "might play the part which God seems to have assigned to them in the Balkans, but which man has thwarted-that, namely, of acting as a link between their Serb and Bulgar brothers, instead of being a permanent cause of division." [74] He did not really expect a positive reaction to this idea from the Foreign Office; yet, as he concluded, "one's mind keeps flying back in this direction, as one goes over the problem day after day, only to find Alps upon Alps of hopelessness arise."[75] But when John Balfour at the Foreign Office read Waterlow's report, he did not consider this a logical idea and maintained that Britain "must continue to concentrate [on the peace treaties] in the forlorn hope that they will pierce a Simplon Tunnel through the Alps of despair."[76]

On the basis of this lengthy debate, which involved those in the Foreign Office and service most concerned with the Macedonian question, the Central Department drafted a new, updated memorandum on the Macedonian question in 1929.[77] Parts of the first version were revised shortly thereafter as a result of last minute critical comments and objections voiced by Waterlow.

The final draft of this lengthy and valuable document, dated 2 July 1930, presented the official British interpretation of the history of the Macedonian question since the 1860s, as well as an analysis of the contemporary political problem.[78] It acknowledged once again that the Slav inhabitants of Macedonia, the Macedo-Slavs or Macedonians, were neither Serbs nor Bulgarians, and thus implicitly recognized their separate and distinct identity. It also admitted the existence in Yugoslav Macedonia of "a uniquely dangerous minority problem, which is aggravated by the fact that the Macedonians are the most stubborn and hard-headed people in the Balkans." [79] It was therefore deeply concerned that the League of Nations could be dragged into the Macedonian problem, first of all, because it was a threat to international peace and, secondly and more importantly, because the Yugoslav minorities treaty, concluded at St. Germain in 1919, applied "to all territories acquired by Serbia as a result of the Balkan wars, and the enforcement of which is entrusted to the League Council."[80] Great Britain, however, could not allow the consideration of the Macedonian question in Yugoslavia by the League of Nations, the body that was specifically delegated to deal with and arbitrate national problems, conflicts and grievances, for it would "inevitably involve the airing of the whole Macedonian problem at Geneva and its discussion could hardly fail to precipitate a crisis which the League Council might find it very difficult to control."[81] London feared that League of Nations consideration of the Macedonian problem in Yugoslavia would amount to a de facto recognition of the Macedonian nationality. This would in turn legitimize to a certain extent the Macedonian demands for a united and independent Macedonia, thus challenging the existing status quo in the Balkans. The Memorandum made this quite clear: "Indeed, once the existence of a Macedonian nationality is even allowed to be presumed there is a danger that the entire Peace Settlement will be jeopardized by the calling into question, not merely of the frontiers between Jugoslavia and Bulgaria, but also of those between Jugoslavia and Greece and between Jugoslavia and Albania" [82] It strongly recommended that "this Balkan cancer" be treated "not by drastic surgical excision (e.g. plebiscite resulting in a change of frontiers....)" but rather "by the use of the healing properties of time and by the use of radium treatment of persuasive diplomacy, which while basing itself on the territorial status quo, shall endeavor gradually to eradicate the open sore that has for so long poisoned the relations of the Balkan states."[83]

The analysis and the recommendations of this memorandum remained the official British position on the Macedonian question virtually until the outbreak of World War II.

The Foreign Office interpreted the subsequent "degeneration" of the IMRO of Ivan Mihailov and, after the military coup in Sofia in 1934, the decline and cessation of its terrorist activities, as signs of the gradual eradication of "this Balkan cancer." In actual fact, this view represented a serious misreading, indeed, a rather crude misunderstanding of the transformation of Macedonian nationalism at the time. The IMRO, which had been divided between a right and a left wing from its very inception, finally split in 1924-1925. The left formed its own separate organization, the IMRO (United) and joined the Balkan Communist Federation and the Comintern. Unlike the right, it had a clearly defined social, economic and particularly national program; unlike the terrorist campaign of the right, it enhanced the cause of both nationalism and communism in Macedonia through underground work. By the early 1930s it had attracted a large following and was challenging Mihailov's IMRO for leadership. Waterlow informed the Foreign Office of the split and the growing strength of the left in his report on the proceedings of the Tenth Congress of the Macedonian Brotherhoods in Bulgaria, the legal organization of Mihailov's IMRO, held in Sofia on 24-27january 1932.

The opposite view [the left], which has lately grown within the movement, which was suppressed at the congress, but which was clearly set out in the communist press, is that Mihailoff has forsaken the ideal of the Macedonian movement, that he does not fight for the liberation of Macedonia and that he has become the tool of the Fascist regime in Bulgaria, which uses the Macedonian organization for the sole purpose of maintaining its dictatorship ...

The Macedonian movement should again become national and independent, it should throw off the tutelage of the Bulgarian Government, which supports it only for its own ends, and it should fight for a genuinely independent Macedonia as part of a Balkan Federation under Soviet protection.[84]

The growth of the left undermined the support of the IMRO of Mihailov and forced the latter, for reasons of self-preservation, to free itself from the tutelage of the Bulgarian government and to identify itself with a Macedonian national program clearly calling for "the unification of Macedonian territories held by Yugoslavia, Greece and Bulgaria, into an independent political entity within its natural geographical frontiers."[85] But it is safe to assume that this reorientation of the IMRO contributed to its suppression in 1934: by the second half of the 1930s most Bulgarians had become convinced "that the Macedonians have been more trouble in Bulgaria than they were worth and merely gave the country a bad name abroad without helping the national [Bulgarian] cause...."[86]

IMRO's suppression, in turn, helped to enhance the role of the Macedonian left, whose nationalist activities had previously been hampered by the IMRO and whose many activists had fallen victims of the mihailovist terror. As Bentinck, the new minister at Sofia, pointed out:

Since the coup d'etat last year, however, the Macedonian communists became much more active, especially in Sofia and Bulgarian Macedonia. I am told the intention was to detach the three portions of Macedonia belonging to Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria, and to unite them into a Soviet Republic - - - At the same time the communist parties in Bulgaria, Jugoslavia and Greece were ordered by Moscow to support the Macedonian communists...[87]

Thus, contrary to the hopes and expectations of the Foreign Office, neither the dissolution of the terrorist IMRO nor "the healing properties of time" resolved the Macedonian problem or caused it to disappear. Macedonian nationalism was forced underground and into the embrace of international communism, where it continued to grow. As Simeon Radev, a prominent Bulgarophile Macedonian and a well known retired Bulgarian diplomat, pointed out to Waterlow, "no solution of the [Macedonian] problem could be expected by the mere aflux of time. There was no prospect whatever of the population acquiescing in the policy of Serbianisation pursued by Belgrade...." He also emphasized "that the Macedonian sense of nationality was not a sense of Bulgarian nationality. It took the shape, especially with the younger generation, of an aspiration for autonomy." [88] On a private visit to Istanbul in September 1933, E. Venizelos, the great Greek statesman, expressed similar sentiments to Sir George Clerk, the British ambassador: Venizelos had always counselled that the Jugoslav Government should make a serious effort to content the Slav Macedonian minority... M. Venizelos maintained that these people, of which Greece has a small share...., are not pure Bulgarians, but something between Bulgarian and Serbian, and he had, he said, always been ready to give them Slav Macedonian schools and other reasonable privileges.[89]

Furthermore, as Radev had also argued, a driving force behind the Macedonian movement at this time was the fundamental belief that anything, however improbable, might occur in a world of flux. And central to this belief was "a desire for a union of all Macedonians in an autonomous state..." [90] As the outbreak of the Second World War approached the growing challenges to the status quo in Europe intensified this belief and desire in the second half of the 1930s.[91] In addition to the USSR or, rather, the communist movement, which already enjoyed widespread support among the Macedonians, by the end of the decade both Germany and Italy actively advocated schemes for "the liberation of Macedonia" with which "they are trying to attract Macedonians ..."[92]

While the Foreign Office either minimized or was ignorant of the strength of Macedonian nationalism on the left, it was not ready to overlook the spread of German and Italian influence in the area. And it was this more than anything else, that brought about a renewed British interest in the Macedonians and the beginning of a British reappraisal of the Macedonian national problem. After the fall of France in summer 1940, G.W. Rendel, the minister at Sofia, warned of the increased Soviet, German and Italian activities in Macedonia and concluded that "Presumably' however the Macedonians would accept any 'autonomous' Macedonian state which a great power succeeds in establishing."[93] He analyzed the aims of the Macedonians in greater detail in a private letter to P.B.B. Nichols of the Foreign Office written ten days later:

My impression is that there is now a fairly large section of the Macedonians who look to Russia for their salvation. ... I think the pro -Russian groups probably hope for the eventual creation of an autonomous Macedonian Soviet Republic as one of a chain of South Slav Soviet states running from the Black Sea to the Adriatic and to the German and Italian frontiers. On the other hand, there are certainly a number of Macedonians who are short sighted enough to be ready to intrigue with Germany and Italy...The Macedonians are notoriously difficult, and have many of the characteristics of the Irish, and my impression is that they are happiest in opposition to any existing regime...[94]

Early in 1941 the vice consul at Skopje provided the Foreign Office with an even more extensive and perceptive analysis of the current state of the Macedonian problem. He claimed that the vast majority of the Macedonians belonged to the national movement; indeed, he estimated "that 90 percent of all Slav Macedonians were autonomists in one sense or another...." Because the movement was wrapped in secrecy, however, it was extremely difficult to gauge the relative strength of its various currents, except that it could be assumed that IMRO had lost ground since it was banned in Bulgaria and its leaders exiled. While the vice consul acknowledged the close relationship between communism and "autonomism" or nationalism in Macedonia, he downplayed the frequently expressed contention that the communists used the Macedonian movement for their own ends.

Instead, he argued that since virtually every Macedonian was an autonomist, it was almost certain "that the Communists and autonomists are the same people..."; and, in any case, that Macedonian communists were not doctrinaire and were "regarded by other Balkan communists as weaker brethren...." "My own opinion," wrote Thomas, "is that they are autonomists in the first place and Communists only in the second."[95] He concluded his lengthy report by stressing what by then should have been obvious: the Macedonian problem was "a real one" and "an acute one" and that it "has in no way been artificially created by interested propaganda." He considered change unavoidable and felt that it was "in the interest of Jugoslavia to satisfy the aspirations of Macedonia."

He was equally convinced, however, that it was highly improbable, "in view of the instinctive dislike of the Serbs engendered by twenty years of Serbian rule, that anything short of autonomy would be acceptable.'' [96]

Rendel's and Thomas's appraisals of the Macedonian situation were not radically different from many produced by their predecessors stationed in the Balkans. However, with the world once more at war, the Foreign Office now accorded them more serious consideration and appeared, although grudgingly, to accept them. It seemed to accept the fact that Britain's hitherto refusal to officially recognize the existence of a Macedonian nationality, a policy that it had shaped and defended for over twenty years, might no longer prove tenable and most likely would not survive the war. In a highly revealing, indeed almost prophetic, comment on Thomas's report, Reginald J. Bowker of the Foreign Office conceded this when he wrote: "To the layman the only possible solution of the Macedonian problem would seem to be in giving the Macedonians some sort of autonomy within Jugoslavia. Possibly after the war the Jugoslavs may be willing to consider this. But such a measure would, no doubt, incur the risk of whetting the appetite of the Macedonians for complete independence."[97]

The lack of official recognition or legitimacy internationally and in the three Balkan states obviously had hindered the normal and natural development of Macedonian identity. However, it could not destroy it. Macedonianism in its various manifestations-particularism, patriotism, nationalism-was too deeply entrenched among the Macedonian people and among the small, but vibrant and dynamic intelligentsia, especially on the political left. During World War II, which began for the Balkans in late 1940 and early 1941, Macedonians in all three parts of their divided land joined resistance movements in large numbers and fought for national unification and liberation.[98] They did not achieve national unification; however, the Macedonians in Vardar or Yugoslav Macedonia won not only national recognition but also legal equality with the other nations of the new, communistled, federal Yugoslavia.

Notes

1. For a discussion of the significance of international recognition or legitimacy in the development of Balkan nationalisms, see especially John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982), 103-11, 115-16 and 373; and Alan Warwick Palmer, The Lands Between: A History of East-Central Europe since the Congress of Vienna (London: Macmillan, 1970), 28-29.

2. See especially Blaze Ristovski, Makedonskiot narod i makedonskata nacija (Skopje: Misla, 1983), 1: 75-86, 163-87, 263-80. Ristovski is the leading authority on Macedonian national thought and development. His two volumes contain previously published studies on the subject. See also the following works published recently in the west: Fikret Adanir, Die Makedonische Frage. Ihre Entstchung und Entwicklung bis 1908 (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1979); Marco Dogo, Lingua e Nazionalita' in Macedonia: Vicende e pensieri di profeti disarmati, 1902-1903 (Milan: Jaca Book, 1985); Jutta de Jong, Die nationale Kern des makedonisehen Problems: Ansatze und Grundlagen einer makedonischen Nationalbeweguag (1890-1903) (Frankfurt: Lang, 1982); Andrew Rossos, "Macedonianism and Macedonian Nationalism on the Left" to be published in Ivo Banac and Katherine Verderv. eds.. Nationa1 Character and National Ideology in Interwar Eastern Europe.

3. The literature on the struggles in Macedonia is vast but rather uneven and polemical in nature. A good documentary survey in English of the activities of the neighboring Balkan states in Macedonia is to be found in George P. Gooch and Harold Temperley. eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914 (London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1926-1938), 5: 100-23. Among the more useful works in western languages are Duncan M. Perry, The Politics of Terror: The Macedonian Revolutionary Movements, 1893-1903 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988); Henry N. Brailsford, Macedonia: Its Races and Their Future (1906, reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1980); Elizabeth Barker, Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics (1950, reprint, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1980); Jacques Ancel, La Macedoine (Paris, 1930); Gustav Weigand, Ethnographie von Makedonien (Leipzig, 1924). For a representative sampling of the divergent points of view, see Jovan M. Jovanovic. Juzna Srbija od kraja XVIII veka do oslobodjenja (Belgrade. 1941) (Serbian); G. Bazhdarov, Makedonskjat vapros vchera i dnes, (Sofia, 1925) (Bulgarian); Georgios Modes, 0 makedonikos agon kai i neoteri makedoniki istoria (Salonica: Etaireia Makedonikon Spoudon. 1967) (Greek). Macedonan historians have turned their attention to this problem more recently. See Kliment Dzambazovski, Kulturno-opstestvenite vrski na Makedoncite so Srbija vo tekot na XIX vek (Skopje: Institut za nacionalna istorija (Ini), 1960); Risto Poplazarov, Grckata politka sprema Makedonija vo vtorata polovina na XIX i pocetokot na XX vek (Skopje: Ini, 1973); Slavko Dimevski, Makedonskoto nacionalno osloboditelno dvizenie i egzarhijata (1893-1912) (Skopje: Kultura, 1963); Krste Bitoski, Makedonija i Knezevstvo Bugarija (1893-1903) (Skopje: Ini, 1977). On the partition of Macedonia, see Andrew Rossos, Russia and the Balkans: Inter-Balkan Rivalries and Russian Foreign Policy. 1908-1914 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981); Petar Stojanov, Makedonija vo vremeto na balkanskite i prvata svetska vojna (1912-1918) (Skopje: Ini, 1969).

4. Blaze Ristovski, Portreti i procesi od makedonskata literaturna i nacionalna istorija (Skopje: Kultura, 1990), 3: 34.

5. Ristovski, op cit. and 2: 24-72; and my forthcoming study "Macedonianism and Macedonian Nationalism on the Left."

6. The Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian claims were extensively publicized. For a representative sampling of the divergent points of view, see Tihomir R. Georgevich, Macedonia (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1918) (Serbian); Iordan Ivanov, La question macedoine (Paris, 1920) (Bulgarian); Cleanthes Nicolaides, La Macedoine (Berlin, 1899) (Greek). See also the works cited in note 3.

7. See (London) Public Record Office, FO371/10667, Central Department, Memorandum, "The Macedonian Question and Komitaji Activity," 26 November 1925, 3-4. (All Foreign Office documents cited hereafter are found in the Public Record Office). See also Hristo Andonov-Poljanski, Velika Britania i makedonskoto prasnje na pariskata mirovna konferencija vo 19l9godina (Skopje: Arhiv na Makedonija, 1973); Ivan Katardziev, Vreme na zreenje. Makedonskoto nacionalno prasanje megju dvete svetski vojni (1919-1930) (Skopje: Kultura, 1977), 1: chap. 1. Katardziev provides the most comprehensive, valuable and interesting treatment of the Macedonian national question in the 1920s.

8. FO371/14316, A. Henderson (Belgrade) to N. Henderson, 9 May 1930, Enclosure 2, "Memorandum by Vice-Consul Blakeney."

9. FO371/29785, Campbell (Belgrade) to Halifax, 6 January 1941. On developments in Vardar Macedonia during the interwar years, see also Katardziev, op.cit., 1: 23-85; Institut za nacionalna istorija, Istorija na makedonskiot narod (Skopje, 1969), 3: part 11; Aleksandar Apostolov, Kolonizacijata na Makedonija vo stara Jugoslavija (Skopje: Kultura, 1966), and "Specificnata polozba na makedonskiot narod vo kralstvoto Jugoslavija," Glasnik (Skopje) 16, no.1(1972): 39-62.

10. FO 371/8566, Bentinck (Athens) to Curzon, 20 August 1923, Enclosure, Colonel A.C. Corfe, "Notes on a Tour Made by the Commission on Greco-Bulgarian Emigration in Western and Central Macedonia," 5. By "Bulgars," Lambros meant Macedonians.

11. On the situation of the Macedonians in Aegean Macedonia, see Andrew Rossos, The Macedonians of Aegean Macedonia: A British Officer's Report, 1944," The Slavonic and East European Review (London) 69, no.2 (April 1991): 282-88. See also Katardziev, Vreme na zreenje, 1: 85-106; Istorija na makedonskiot narod, 3: part 13; Stojan Kiselinovski, Grckata kolonizacija vo Egeiska Makedonija (1913-1940) (Skopje: Ini, 1981); Lazo Mojsov, Okolu prasanjeto na makedonskoto nacionalno malcinstovo vo Grcija (Skopje: Ini, 1954), 207-87; Giorgi Abadziev, et al., Egejska Makedonija vo nasata nacionalna istorija (Skopje, 1951).

12. Rossos, "Macedonians of Aegean Macedonia," 293-94. Captain P.H. Evans' "Report on the Free Macedonia Movement in Area Florina 1944" is given verbatim, 291-309.

13. FO371/12856, Kennard (Belgrade) to Sargent, 16 February 1928

14. FO371/8568, 22. A few years later, O. Sargent, a counselor in the Foreign Office, complained that "the Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation... defies openly the Bulgarian Government and practically administers and governs part of the Bulgarian territory" (FO371/12856, Sargent [London] to Sperling, 1 October 1928).

15. On Pirin Macedonia as well as the Macedonians in Bulgaria, see Katardziev, Vreme na zreenje, 1: 107-19; Istorija na makedonskiot narod, 3: part 12; Dimitar Mitrev, Pirinska Makedonija (Skopje: Nasa Kniga 1970), 126-202.

16. See Stefan Troebst, Mussolini, Makedonien und die Machte, 1922-1930: Die "Innere Makeodnische Revolutionare Organisation" in der Sudosteuropapolitik der faschistischen Italien (Cologne: Bohlau, 1987); and Barker, Macedonia, chap. 2; Leften S. Stavrianos, Balkan Federation: A History of the Movement Toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times (1944, reprint, Hamden: Archon Books, 1964), chaps. 8 and 9.

17. FO371/8568, p.22.

18. FO371/7375, Erskine (Sofia) to Curzon, 25 January 1922. Harold Nicolson commented: "There is less disparity between the Irish and Macedonian temperament than might be supposed" (Minute, 1 February 1922).

19. Katardziev, Vreme na zreenje, 1: part 2, chap. 1.

20. Kiselinovski, Grckata kolonizacija, chap. 4.

21. Katardziev, op.cit.; Dino Kiosev, Istoria na makedonskoto natsionalno revoliutsionerno dvizhenie (Sofia: Otechestven front 1954) 493-99

22. Katardziev, Vreme na zreenje, 1:171-83 and part 2, chap. 2; Kiosev, ibid., 512- 28. On the activities of the IMRO in all three parts of Macedonia, see also the memoirs of its leader after 1924: Ivan Mikhailov, Spomeni, 4 vols. (Selci, Louvain, Indianapolis, 1952, 1965, 1967, 1973).

23. Katardziev, Vreme na zreenje, 1: 375-76; Istorija na makedonshiot narod, 3: 20-23, 176-78; Evangelos Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia (Salonica: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1964), 69; Dimitrios G. Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat: The Story of the Communist Party of Greece (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 65.

24. FO371/7377, Erskine (Sofia) to Curzon, 20 March 1922.

25. FO371/6197, Peel (Sofia) to Curzon, 10 February 1921.

26. See FO371/8568.

27. On communism and Macedonian nationalism, see Katardziev, Vreme na zreenje, 1: part 3, chaps. 1-4, 2: part 5, and ed., Predavnicite na makedonskoto delo (Skopje: Kultura, 1983), 5-56; Stojan Kiselinovski, KPG i makedonskoto nacionalno prasanje, 1918-1940 (Skopje: Misla, 1985), chaps. 2-4; Kiril Miljovski, Makedonskoto prasanje vo nacionalnata programa na KPJ (1919-1937) (Skopje: Kultura, 1962), 24-140; Dimitar Mitrev, BKP i Pirinska Makedonija (Skopje: Kultura, 1960), 42-59; Kofos, op.cit., chap. 4; Darinka Pacemska, Vnatresnata makedonska revolucionerna organizacija (Obedineta) (Skopje: "Studentski zbor," 1985). I have dealt with the subject in "Macedonianism and Macedonian Nationalism on the Left" to be published in Ivo Banac and Katherine Verdery, eds., Nationa1 Character and National Ideology in Interwar Eastern Europe.

28. FO371/10667, Central Department, Memorandum, "The Macedonian Question and Komitaji Activity," 26 November 1925, 4.

29. FO371/10793, Kennard (Belgrade) to A. Chamberlain, 6July 1925, Enclosure, Footman (Skopje) to Kennard, 30 June 1925, 5. John David Footman was a fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford (1953-1963) and author of several books on modern Russian history.

30. See especially ibid., 14 and FO371/8568, 3 and FO371/10667, 6.

31. FO371/11405, Kennard (Belgrade) to A. Chamberlain, 21 April 1926; Enclosure R.A. Gallon. "Conditions in Macedonia," 19 April 1926, 4.

32. F0371111245, O. Ch. Harvey, "Notes on a Visit to Jugoslavia and Greece," April 1926, 6 May 1926, 3.

33. FO371/11405, 5.

34. FO371/10793, 6.

35. FO371/8566, 3.

36. FO371/10793, 6.

37. FO371/14316, N. Henderson (Belgrade) to A. Henderson, 13 May 1930, En-closures.

38. FO371/14317, Central Department, Memorandum, "The Origins of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation and Its History Since the Great War," 1 July 1930, 12.

39. See FO371/11337, Kennard (Belgrade) to H. Smith, Enclosure, R.A. Gallop "Notes," 23 April 1926.

40. FO371/11337, C.H. Bateman, "Memorandum on "Serbian Minorities in Greek Macedonia," 3 March 1926, 2.

41. Ibid.

42. See FO371/10793 and FO371/11337.

43. FO371/11337.

44. See FO371/8568.

45. FO371/8566.

46. FO371/10793. Footman dismissed the Serbian claims to a "Serbian minority" in Aegean Macedonia and pointed to two other factors as the real causes of the Greek- -Serbian dispute: "a) Politically, the Serb displeasure at Slav inhabitants of Greek Macedonia being recognized as Bulgars; and b) Economically, the loss suffered by Serbian Macedonia and the Kingdom as a whole by being separated by a frontier from Salonica" (6).

47. FO371/10667, Central Department, Memorandum, "The Macedonian Question and Komitaji Activity," 26 November 1925. It gave the following figures: Macedonian Slavs 1,150,000; Turks 400,000; Greeks 300,000; Vlachs 200,000; Albanians 120,000;Jews 100,000; Gypsies 10,000 (2).

48. Ibid., 4.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid., 1, 4; See also Rossos, "Macedonians of Aegean Macedonia," 284-85, 290, 293-94.

52. Ibid., 7.

53. FO371/11337,1

54. Ibid., 4.

55. FO371/11405, Kennard (Belgrade) to A. Chamberlain, 21 April 1926, Enclosure, R.A. Gallop, "Conditions in Macedonia," 19 April 1926,1.

56. "I should like to know the names of any authorities who are impartial," wrote Gallop. "Certainly none of the Serbian, Bulgarian, Russian, British or German ever are!" (FO371/11337, Enclosure, 23 April 1926).

57. FO371/11245, 2.

58. Ibid., p.3.

59. Footman argued that "such local autonomy would have greater chance of success were it to be introduced by some future government in which Croats and Slovenes held the preponderating position. There is throughout Macedonia a sullen bitterness against the Serbs..." (FO371/12856, Footman [Skopje] to Kennard, 4 February 1928 in Kennard [Belgrade] to Chamberlain, 18 February 1928).

60. Ibid., Kennard (Belgrade) to Sargent, 16 February 1928, Minute, 24 February 1928; see also Sargent (London) to Kennard, 20 February 1928.

61. Ibid., Sperling (Sofia) to Cushendun, 13 September 1928.

62. Ibid., Kennard (Belgrade) to Sargent, 20 September 1928.

63. Ibid., C.H. Bateman, Minute, 20 September 1928.

64. Ibid., 0. Sargent, Minute, 28 September 1928.

65. Ibid., R.G. Vansittart, Minute, 29 September 1928. Robert Gilbert Vansittart was knighted in 1929 and created a baron in 1941

66. Ibid., Sargent (London) to Sperling, 10 October 1928

67. Ibid., Sperling (Sofia) to Sargent, 10 October 1928.

68. Ibid., C.H. Bateman, Minute, 18 October 1928.

69. Ibid., Sargent (London) to Sperling, 22 October 1928

70. "The fact was of course that the framers of the Minorities Treaty hesitated to mention them under any specific name," wrote Bateman. "The most they could be called is Macedo-Slavs" (ibid., C.H. Bateman, Minute, 18 October 1928).

71. Great Britain, Foreign Office, The Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book for 1935 (London, 1935), 416.

72. FO371/14316, Waterlow (Sofia) to Vansittart, 21 May 1930.

73. Ibid., 7.

74. Ibid., 8-9.

75. Ibid., 9.

76. Ibid., J. Balfour, Minute, 2 June 1930.

77. FO371/13573, Central Department, Memorandum, "The Macedonian Question and Komitaji Activity," 6 December 1929, 9 pp.

78. FO371/14317, Central Department, Memorandum, "The Origins of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization and Its History Since the Great War," 1 July 1930,16 pp.

79. Ibid., 9.

80. Ibid., 14.

81. Ibid., 15.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid., 16.

84. FO371/57473, Waterlow (Sofia) to Simon, 5 February 1932. According to the assistant to the Bishop of Nevrokop, one of the major centers of Pirin Macedonia, "The Revolutionary Organization itself was split by a growing Communist current, ... aiming at the liberation of Macedonia by the bolshevisation of the Balkans, while the local population was in its turn divided, about half being for the organization and half against, and the hostile half being largely Communist in feeling (FO371/15896, Waterlow [Sofia] to Simon, 22 June 1932; see also FO371/19486, Bentinck [Sofia] to Hoare, 16 September 1935 and 26 September 1935). On the left of the Macedonian movement see also the works cited in note 27.

85. FO371/16650, Waterlow (Sofia) to Simon, 27 February 1933.

86. FO371/24880, Rendel (Sofia) to Nichols, 25 August 1940.

87. FO371/19486. Bentinck (Sofia) to Hoare, 26 September 1935.

88. FO371/16651, Waterlow (Sofia) to Simon, 21 July 1933.

89. FO371/16775, Clerk (Constaninople) to Simon, ^ October 1933.

90. FO371/16651

91. On the aims of Macedonian nationalism on the left in the 1930s, see Biblioteka "Makedonsko zname," no.1, Ideite i zadachite na Makedonskoto progresivno dvizenje v Bulgaria (Sofia, 1933); Ristovski, Makedonskiot narod i Makedonskata Nacija, 2: 481-560; and my forthcoming study "Macedonianism and Macedonian Nationalism on the Left."

92. FO371/24880, Rendel (Sofia)to F.O., 15 August 1940.

93. Ibid.

94. FO371/24880, Rendel (Sofia) to Nichols, 25 August 1940. George L. Clutton of the Foreign Office described the Macedonians as "discontented peasants who are anti-Jugoslav, anti-Greek, anti-Bulgarian, anti-German, and anti everything except possibly anti-Russian" (FO371/24880, Campbell [Belgrade] to F.O., 4 September 1940, G.L. Clutton, Minute, 10 September 1940).

95. FO371/29785, Campbell (Belgrade) to Halifax, 6 January 1941, Enclosure, "Report on the General Situation in Southern Serbia by Mr. Thomas, British Vice-Consul at Skoplje."

96. Ibid..

97. Ibid., Reginald J. Bowker, Minute, l6 January 1941.

98. On the aims of Macedonian nationalism during the Second World War, see the informative and illuminating discussions by Kiril Miljovski, "Motivite na revolucijata 1941-1944 godina vo Makedonija," Istorija (Skopje) 10, no.1 (1974): 19ff; and by Cvetko Uzunovski, "Vostanieto vo 1941 vo Makedonija," Istorija, 10, no.2 (1974): 103 if.

Chronology of Macedonian History

C. 653 B.C.
Ancient Macedonia has been divided as Up and Down Macedonia. King Perdiccas I establishes the Macedonian Kingdom. Ancient Macedonian kings from Perdicca I to Perdicca III .

359-336 B.C.
Significant military and financial reforms carried out during the reign of Philip II , determining the geographical, historical, and ethnic boundaries of Macedonia.

336-323 B.C.
Reign of Alexander the Great , King of Macedon. Macedonia reaches the peak of its military power. He spreads Macedonian culture to the East.

215-205, 200-193, 171-167 B.C.
Macedonian - Roman wars. Macedonia falls under Roman rule.

A.D. 535
The Byzantine Emperor establishes the town of Justiniana Prima (in the vicinity of Skopje), an important church (archbishop's seat) and political centre in the Balkans.

855
The brothers Cyril and Methody -- create the first Slavonic alphabet .

886
Clement comes to Macedonia, spreads Christianity in the Slavonic language and founds the Ohrid Literary School. After Clement of Ohrid Naum was the most consistent and worthy of the pupils of the Salonica brothers Cyril and Methodius .

969
The sons of komes Nicholas (David, Moses, Aaron, and Samuil) rebel against Bulgarian authority and establish the medieval Macedonian state, which in 997 becomes the Macedonian Empire.

1014
Battle of Mount Belasica. The army of the Macedonian Tsar Samuil is defeated by the Byzantines.

1018
The Macedonian Empire falls under Byzantine rule.

1040-1042
Insurrection against Byzantine authority led by Petar Deljan.

1072-1073
Gjorgji Vojteh's insurrection based in Macedonia.

1371
The Battle of Marica and penetration of the Turks into the Balkans.

1395
Macedonia falls under Turkish domination.King Marko dies in a battle near Rovin.

1564-1565
The Mariovo - Prilep Rebellion, the first known rebellion of the Macedonian peasants.

1689
The Karpos Uprising, insurrection of the Macedonian people against the Turks in the Kriva Palanka and Kumanovo regions.

1767
The Abolition of the Archbishopric of Ohrid by an irade of the Sultan under the pressure of the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople.

1822
The Negus Uprising, insurrection of the Macedonians for liberation in the Aegean part of Macedonia.

1876
The Razlovci Uprising, insurrection in eastern Macedonia which heralded the national liberation struggle.

1878-1879
The Macedonian Kresna Uprising, insurrection which adopted a constitution known as The Rules of the Macedonian Uprising Committee.

1894
Establishment of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization. Gotse Delchev joins the Organization.

1902
Foundation of the Slavonic - Macedonian Scholarly Literary Society in St. Petersburg, Russia.

1903
The Ilinden Uprising and the ten days of the Krushevo Republic. The Manifesto of the Krushevo Republic

1909
Establishment and activity of the Popular Federal Party.

1912-13
The Balkan Wars and Macedonia's partition with the Peace Treaty of Bucharest.

1914-1918
The First World War.

1919
The Treaty of Versailles sanctions the partition of Macedonia.

1924
The May Manifesto, resolution of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia on the right of the Macedonian people to self- determination.

1925
The establishment of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (United).

1934
The Fourth Nationwide Conference of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. This passed a decision on the establishment of a national party in Macedonia.

1936
Establishment and ideational-political formation of the MANAPO (Macedonian National Movement).

1936
Foundation of the Macedonian Literary Society in Sofia by outstanding Macedonian writers.

1940
The Fifth Nationwide Conference of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. This passed a resolution on the equality and self- determination of the Macedonian people.

1939-1945
The Second World War.

1941-1944
Macedonia's participation in the Second World War (National Liberation War of Macedonia).

1944
Proclomation of the Macedonian state. (August 2).

1945
Formation of the first government of the People's Republic of Macedonia (April 16).

1945
Adoption of the Macedonian alphabet.

1946
Start of university education in Macedonian (Faculty of Philosophy).

1946
Adoption of the first constitution of the People's Republic of Macedonia.

1967
Foundation of the Macedonian Academy of Arts and Sciences.

1967
Proclomation of the autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church (Restoration of the Archbishopric of Ohrid).

1991
Referendum on a sovereign and independent state (September 8).

1991
Adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia (November 17).

1993
Macedonia is admitted to the United Nations.

1995
Macedonia becomes a member of the Council of Europe.

ANCIENT MACEDONIA AND GREECE

In the course of the second pre-Christian millennium, the ancient Greeks descended in several migratory waves from the interior of the Balkans to Greece. Some passed across the plain of Thessaly on their way south, while others went south through Epirus. More recent scholars point to Asia Minor as the original Greek homeland. There is no evidence that the ancient Greeks ever settled prehistoric Macedonia. Archeological evidence shows that ancient Macedonia lay beyond the cultural and ethnic borders of the Bronze Age Mycenaean Greek Civilization, which ends at the border of northern Thessaly (1400 - 1100 BC). The prehistoric Macedonians show a remarkable continuation of existing material culture.

Ancient Macedonia was home to many tribes. The ancient Macedonian tribes emerged from the Brygians or Phrygians. Some of the Brygians left Macedonia and migrated to Asia Minor where they changed their name to Phrygians and established a powerful Phrygian kingdom (Herodotus). When the Macedonian army under Alexander the Great will enter Phrygia centuries later, Philotas spoke of the connections between the Phrygians and the Macedonians, by calling the Macedonians "Phrygians" (Curtius).

Greek migrants settled few coastal areas of Macedonia, Thrace, and Illyria after they exhausted the possibilities of settlement in Asia Minor, Italy, France, Spain and Scythia (Ukraine and Russia). However, they did not consider Macedonia especially attractive for permanent settlement. Neither did the Macedonians welcome them as open-heartedly as did the Italians and Scythians. By the middle of the fourth century BC, the Greek settlers were expelled from Macedonia and their cities, including Aristotle's native Stragira, razed to the ground by the Macedonian king Philip II (360-336). Aristotle died in exile in Greece.

The ancient Macedonians regarded the Greeks as potentially dangerous neighbors, never as kinsmen. The Greeks stereotyped the Macedonians as "barbarians" and treated them in the same bigoted manner in which they treated all non-Greeks. Herodotus, the Father of History, relates how the Macedonian king Alexander I(498-454 BC), a Philhellene (that is "a friend of the Greeks" and logically a non-Greek), wanted to take a part in the Olympic games. The Greek athletes protested, saying they would not run with a barbarian. Historian Thucydidis also calls the Macedonians barbarians, and so did Thracymachus who called Archelaus a barbarian who enslaved Greeks. Demosthenes, the great Athenian statesman and orator, spoke of Philip II as:

"... not only no Greek, nor related to the Greeks, but not even a barbarian from any place that can be named with honors, but a pestilent knave from Macedonia, whence it was never yet possible to buy a decent slave." [Third Philippic, 31]

The Macedonian "barbarian" defeated Greece at the battle of Chaeronea in August 338 BC and appointed himself "Commander of the Greeks". This battle had established Macedonian hegemony over Greece and this date is commonly taken as the end of Greek history and the beginning of the Macedonian era. Greece did not regain its independence until 1827 AD.

In 335 BC, Philip's son Alexander campaigned toward the Danube, to secure Macedonia's northern frontier. On rumors of his death, a revolt broke out in Greece with the support of leading Athenians. Alexander marched south covering 240 miles in two weeks. When the revolt continued he sacked Thebes, killing 6,000 people and enslaving the survivors. Only the temples and the house of the poet Pindar were spared.

The Ancient Macedonian Language

The Macedonians spoke their own native language which was unrecognizable by the Greeks. The very label barbarian literally means a person who does not speak Greek. Though Alexander spoke also Greek, loved Homer, and respected his tutor Aristotle, there is much evidence that he hated the Greeks of his day, just like his father Philip II. Philip had razed to the ground the Greek cities on Macedonian territory (including all 32 Greek cities in Chalcidice) and enslaved their inhabitants. Alexander the Great thoroughly destroyed Thebes. His Asian empire has not once been described as "Greek", but is correctly called Macedonian for he won it with an army of 35,000 Macedonians and only 7,600 Greeks, and similar numbers of Thracians and Illyrians who were all forced to fight with their Macedonian overlords. The overwhelming number of Greeks however, 50,000 in total (Curtius), had however, distinguished themselves on the side of the Persians and fought fiercely till the end against the Macedonians. For instance, at the battle of Granicus there were 20,000 Greeks, out of which the Macedonians killed 18,000 and the 2,000 survivors were sent in chains to Macedonia (Arrian, Curtius). Arrian specifically speaks of the "old racial rivalry" between Macedonians and Greeks that characterized this battle. At the battle of Issus, there were 30,000 Greeks on the side of the Persians to fight Alexander, and their survivors also fought at Gaugamela along with the Albanians and the Persians, against the Macedonians.

The question of the use of the ancient Macedonian language was raised by Alexander himself during the trial of Philotas, one of his generals accused of treason. This is what Alexander has said to Philotas:

"The Macedonians are about to pass judgement upon you; I wish to know weather you will use their native tongue in addressing them." Philotas replied: "Besides the Macedonians there are many present who, I think, will more easily understand what I shell say if I use the same language which you have employed." Than said the king: "Do you not see how Philotas loathes even the language of his fatherland? For he alone disdains to learn it. But let him by all means speak in whatever way he desires, provided that you remember that he holds out customs in as much abhorrence as our language" (Curtius).

The trial of Philotas took place in Asia before a multiethnic public, which has understood Greek as it was then a common language, like English today. But Alexander spoke Macedonian with his Macedonians (the language he accuses Philotas of loathing) and used Greek in addressing the west Asians. Like Carthagenian, Illyrian, and Thracian, ancient Macedonian was not recorded in writing. However, on the bases of about a hundred glosses, Macedonian words noted and explained by Greek writers, some place names from Macedonia, and a few names of individuals, most scholars believe that ancient Macedonian was a separate Indo-European language. Evidence from phonology indicates that the ancient Macedonian language was distinct from ancient Greek.

THE ROMAN OCCUPATION

Both Macedonia and Greece were annexed by the Romans after the battle of Pydna in 168 BC. It is significant that the Greeks again fought against the Macedonians during the Macedonian Wars, on the side of the Romans. The Macedonians were asked to evacuate from the whole of Greece and withdrew to Macedonia by the Romans, and the Greek fought against the Macedonian army and its king Philip V until their final defeat (Polybius, Livy). After the end of the Macedonian kingdom, Latin was the official language in Roman Macedonia from 168 BC until the demise of Roman rule at the end of the sixth century AD.

SLAV SETTLEMENTS IN MACEDONIA, GREECE, THRACE, AND ILLYRIA

In the sixth century, the Slavs penetrated Illyria, Thrace, Macedonia, and Greece. The Slavs settled lands as far as Peloponnesus and the Aegean islands, and some of the Slavic tribes in Greece remained unconquered for centuries. During the following centuries, the Slavs mixed with the original Macedonians, Greeks, Thracians, and Illyrians, and thus laid the foundations to the modern nations of the Balkans, and their modern languages.

Today's modern Macedonian language has both ancient Macedonian and Slavic background. How much modern Macedonian is based upon ancient Macedonian is impossible to say since we do not have many ancient Macedonian words that have survived, except about 150 glosses. Yet, ancient Macedonian words are still present in modern Macedonian. Alexander's infantry peshatairoi literally means "armed walking men" in modern Macedonian (peshatari). Hammond says that the ancient Macedonians called their commander tchelniku, which again means in modern Macedonian "somebody who leads" (chelniku). The Macedonian prodromoi, were the openers in the battles of Alexander the Great. Today in modern Macedonian this means "somebody who penetrates" (prodir), etc. Many ancient Macedonian names are still present among today's Macedonians, and many ancient Macedonian customs have the ancients have described have survived as well among today's Macedonians. The memory of Philip II and Alexander the Great echoes in the Macedonian folklore.

The modern Macedonian language was systemized in the middle of the ninth century by SS Cyril and Methodius, the two Macedonian brothers from the largest Macedonian city of Salonica. This language has functioned as the principal literary, liturgical, and colloquial language of Macedonia ever since. This period of the Macedonian history set the foundations for the development of the modern Macedonian nation and in the centuries after the coming of the Slavs, the Macedonians continue to exist in Byzantine sources as nation. Macedonia resisted the settlement attacks by the Armenian and Syrian dynasties, who held power in New Rome (Byzantium), and by the nomadic Bulgarians. From 1014 to 1204, Macedonia was part of the multi-cultural Byzantine Empire. In the next two centuries, the Macedonians fought foreign invaders, adventurers, and bandits who failed to dominate their land, apart from the Serbs and the Bulgarians who briefly held it. In the fifteenth century, the Ottoman Turks succeeded in conquering all of Macedonia, Greece, and the rest of the Balkans, and enforced their 500-year old rule.

MACEDONIA IN THE XIX CENTURY

Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian Independence

In 1827, the European powers intervened on behalf of the Greek rebels and forced the Turks to grant them independence. The same powers, established the first modern Greek state, chose Prince Otto of Bavaria to be the "King of the Hellenes", and sent him to Athens. Serbia freed herself also from the Turkish rule, while Russia declared war on Turkey to help Bulgaria gain its independence.

San Stefano and Berlin Conferences

The war between Russia and Turkey ended on March 3, 1878, with the peace settlement of San Stefano. The Turks had to agree to the formation of the new Bulgarian state, to also include all of Macedonia but the city of Salonika. Russia was hoping that greater Bulgaria with Macedonia would give her the strategic exit on the Aegean Sea, but she encountered fierce resistance from Austria-Hungary and England that saw their interests on the Balkans endangered. On July 13, 1878 with the Berlin Conference, they forced Russia to give up her dream and the San Stefano agreement was revised. Macedonia was returned to the Ottoman Empire. From this moment, Macedonia became a battleground where the interests not only of the Balkan states, but also of the Great Powers, collide.

The Macedonian and Greek Orthodox Churches

The Ohrid Archiepiscopy was founded as a separate church in 995 to care for the religious needs of the Orthodox Macedonians. However, under the influence of the Greek Orthodox church, the Turkish sultan abolished the Macedonian church in 1767. The Greek Orthodox church was now able to enforce its religious teachings in Greek as the only Orthodox church to exist in the Balkans. Greece hoped to spread her influence and propaganda through the newly opened Greek schools, with a goal to Hellenize the population of Macedonia. But as their influence grew bigger, so did the resistance of the Macedonians. On March 7, 1851, the residents of Enidje-Vardar (today in Greece) signed a petition, for replacement of the teachings in Greek with Macedonian. In 1859, in Kukush was formed the resistance movement against the Hellenization that quickly spread to Voden (Edessa), Kostur (Kastoria), Lerin (Florina), and the rest of southern Macedonia.

Balkan and Neutral Statistics on the Population of Macedonia

Adding to the Greek influence, the Bulgarians opened their schools in Macedonia in 1871, and the Serbs followed shortly after. This is the beginning of the so-called "Macedonian Question". The new independent Balkan states used those schools to propagate how the Macedonians do not exist, and how Macedonia was populated only by Greeks, Bulgarians, and Serbs. Ethnographers, historians, and writers begun writing books in favor of this or that propaganda. Many of them did not even visit Macedonia, while those who did already had a written scenario. Their presence there was only a simple formality. The Turkish statistics made the picture more confusing as the Turks registered the people based on religion, not on ethnic background.  Table 1 gives an excellent proof of those Balkan speculations surrounding Macedonia:

Table 1. Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian Statistics of Macedonia's population

It is more than obvious that all the views coming from the Macedonia's neighbors which sharply contradict eachother, are biased. They all claim their people in Macedonia to justify their well-planned aspirations. It is important to note that both the Bulgarian and Serbian views agree that the Greeks in Macedonia represent only a small minority of 10%. The Greek ethnographer Nikolaides, on the other hand, claims three times bigger number than his colleagues in Belgrade and Sofia. However, the most important about Nikolaides is that he recognizes the Macedonian Slavs as a separate nation, separate from the Bulgarians and the Serbs, to be part of population of Macedonia. And although he tries hard to lower the numbers of those Macedonian Slavs, he still comes up with a convincing proof of their existence.

This is the time when many European slavists, ethnographers, and historians, are also attracted to visit Macedonia and conduct their own investigations. Therefore, to find the unbiased population numbers in Macedonia, we have to rely on neutral and independent statistics:

Although the Macedonians are referred as "Macedonian Slavs", the main point of the statistics is the fact that they are recognized as distinct nation with cultural and historical right over their country Macedonia in which they are overwhelming majority. The reluctance to refer to them for what they are (simply as Macedonians), is explained by the overemphasizing of the contemporary Greek vs. Slavic (Serb and Bulgarian) rivalry over Macedonia in which the westerners desired to make the note that the Macedonians were more "Slavs" then "Greeks" - thus resulting in the use of the term "Macedonian Slavs" to distinguish them from all but still indicate their closer relation to their northern then southern neighbors, as interestingly was the case with the ancient Macedonians and their closer relations with the Thracians and Illyrians then with the ancient Greeks.

Yet the term "Macedonian Slavs" is erroneous since the Macedonians, although conscious of their ancient Macedonian roots and Slav admixture, did not specifically call themselves "Macedonians Slavs", but Macedonians as the documents over the last 2,500 years show. The same "Macedonian Slavs" mistake was again repeated by some western media, as the Albanian terrorists attacked Macedonia in March of 2001, and again it was done deliberately.  This deliberate bias is again there, unfortunately because of the political situation and the western media's inclination towards the goals of the Albanian terrorism for "Greater Albania".  As at the beginning of the 20th century, the Macedonians showed their outrage at the beginning of the 21st century of this racial insult and publicly instead that their nationality be respected. Not only the Macedonians all over the world vigorously accused the western media for racial bias, but also did various western independent and non-government organizations. That referring to the Macedonians as "Macedonian Slavs" was a mistake was publicly acknowledged by BBC which apologized and withdrew its reporter Paul Wood precisely for his bias reporting, and since continued to rightfully refer to the Macedonians for what they have always been - Macedonians.

From the two above tables one can easily notice that the number of Greeks in Macedonia according to the neutral authors also aligns with the numbers given by the Serb and Bulgarian authors. This is a proof that the Greeks before the partition of Macedonia, were indeed a small minority, only 10% from the total population. This fact certainly does not give them the copyright of the name Macedonia. Dr. Ostreich, Gersin, and Roussos, are only a few of the many neutral authors to prove the groundless speculations of the Balkan counties. They proved that Macedonia belongs to a separate nation, which proves that the Bulgarians and the Serbs have than simply substituted the numbers of the Macedonians for theirs. Another Austrian, Karl Hron explained why that is unjustified:

"According to my own studies on the Serb-Bulgarian conflict I came to the conclusion that the Macedonians looking at their history and language are a separate nation, which means they are not Serbs nor Bulgarians, but the descendants of those Slavs who populated the Balkan peninsula long before the Serb and Bulgarian invasions, and who later did not mix with any of those other two nations..." and:

"... the Macedonian language according to its own laws in the development of the voices, and its own grammatical rules, forms one separate language".

There were even Greek and Bulgarian writers to support what Karl Hron has written. One such example is the Bulgarian slavist and ethnographer P. Draganov, who in his studies of 1887-1894 and 1903, proved the existence of the Macedonians and the Macedonian language as a distinct language. Here is what Henry Brailsford had said about the Macedonians in "Macedonia: its Races and their Future".

"Are the Macedonians Serbs or Bulgars? The question is constantly asked and dogmatically answered in Belgrade and Sofia. But the lesson of history is obviously that there is no answer at all. They are not Serbs, for their blood can hardly be purely Slavonic... On the other hand, they can hardly be Bulgarians... They are very probably very much what they were before either a Bulgarian or a Serbian Empire existed - a Slav people derived from various stocks, who invaded the peninsula at different periods."

At the time of the emergence of the so-called Macedonian question, and the aspirations of the Macedonian neighbors for occupation of the country, the famous Macedonian Gjorgi Pulevski wrote in 1875:

"People who originate from one and the same race, speak the same language, live together in harmony, and have the same customs, songs and mentality, constitute a nation, and the place where they live is their homeland. In this way, the Macedonians are a nation and their homeland is Macedonia" and,

"I am not Bulgarian, nor Greek, nor Tzintzar, I am pure Macedonian as were Philip and Alexander the Macedonian and Aristotle Philosopher"

Pulevski was right back in 1875.  He was conscious and aware that the Macedonians were a distinct nation, a fact that the documents of the last 25 centuries clearly show.

Macedonian Uprisings

The Macedonians will first start an organized resistance in the XIX century, to free their land from the 500 year old Turkish yoke. The uprisings in Kresna and Razlog (1878 - 1879), although unsuccessful, gained sympathies of many intellectuals in Europe. Among them was W.E. Gladstone who wrote:

"... Next to the Ottoman government nothing can be more deplorable and blameworthy than jealousies between Greek and Slav and plans by the states already existing for appropriating other territory. Why not Macedonia for the Macedonians as well as Bulgaria for the Bulgarians and Serbia for the Serbians."

Gladstone was three times elected Prime Minister of England (1868 -1874; 1880 - 1885 and 1893 - 1894). He supported the Macedonian nation in its quest for freedom. Perhaps Macedonia would have gained its independence had this man been once again elected Prime Minister during the big Ilinden Uprising on August 2, 1903. Left without any support, the uprising was crushed by the Turks, followed by the massacre on the innocent Macedonian population.

THE PARTITION OF MACEDONIA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

On October 8, 1912, the First Balkan War begun. Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece attacked the European positions of the Ottoman Empire. More than 100,000 Macedonians also took active part and contributed in driving the Turks out of Macedonia. Turkey capitulated soon, but Macedonia did not free itself. The victorious Balkan kingdoms convened in Bucharest in August 1913 to divide the spoils. The partition of Macedonia is best illustrated with the following maps:

Greece was awardedAegean Macedonia and renamed it to "Northern Greece"; Bulgaria annexed Pirin Macedonia and abolished the Macedonian name, and Serbia took over Vardar Macedonia and renamed it to "Southern Serbia".The same year, N. Pasich of Serbia and E. Venizelos of Greece agreed on the newly formed Greek-Serbian (later Yugoslavian) border, so that there would be "only Serbs to the North and only Greeks to the South", and no "Macedonians" on either side. Thus, the politics to assimilate the Macedonians of Aegean Macedonia had already begun.

The Greek Atrocities in Aegean Macedonia

1.      On June 21, 22, and 23, 1913, the Greek army completely burned to the ground the city of Kukush (today Kilkis), known for its resistance against Hellenism in the XIX century and the birthplace of Gotse Delchev.

2.      Between June 29 and 25, 39 villages in the Kukush area were also burned down.

3.      On June 23 and 24, the city of Serres (today Serrai) was set on fire where 4000 houses perished. In the Serres gymnasium the Greeks murdered about 200 people.

4.      During these days the larger portion of Strumica was also destroyed by the Greek army.

5.      Between June 23 and 30, many villages in the Drama and Serres districts were burned down.

6.      From June 27 to July 6 all Macedonian quarts of Salonika were set on fire.

The Carnegie Commission composed of members from USA, Germany, Russia, France, Austria, and England, witnessed the Greek atrocities when visited Aegean Macedonia. Their final conclusion was that the Greek army has burned to the ground 170 villages with over 17,000 houses.

Since 1913, official Greece has been trying to banish native Macedonian names of villages, towns, cities, rivers, and lakes in Aegean Macedonia. For example, the little stream which issues from Mount Olympus and flows into the Aegean Sea is labeled Mavroneri ("black water") on the maps made by Greek cartographers after 1913. However, the same river appears as Crna Reka, a native Macedonian name meaning "black river" on the maps made before 1913. Kukush has been dropped for Kilkis and Serres for Serai, together with at least 300 other places all over Macedonia.

Forced Change of the Ethnic Structure of Aegean Macedonia

The presence of the Macedonians in Aegean Macedonia could not allow Greece to claim that land to be Greek and only Greek. Since it was proven that they resisted the Hellenization, Greece decided to drive them out of Macedonia. Greece made agreements with Bulgaria (signed 10/27/19), and Turkey (1/30/23 in Lausanne), for exchange of population. This provided for the Macedonians of Aegean to leave for Bulgaria, while the Greeks in Bulgaria and Turkey settled in the Aegean part of Macedonia. These measures changed the ethnic character of the Aegean Macedonia. According to the "Great Greek Encyclopedia", there were 1,221,849 newcomers against 80,000 "slavophones". The "Ethnic Map of Greek Macedonia Showing the Ratio Between Various Ethnic Elements in 1912 and 1926," claims there were 119,000 "bulgarisants" in 1912, and 77,000 in 1926. The Greek ethnic map of Aegean Macedonia was submitted to the League of the nations by the Greek government. The League of the Nations had not visited Aegean Macedonia and did not participate at all in conducting this statistics. Greece here refers to the Macedonians as "bulgarisants", which means "those who pretend to be Bulgarians" and obviously non-Bulgarians. However, Greece uses many other names in falsifying the identity of the Macedonians. Slavophones, Slav Macedonians, Makedoslavs, Slav Greeks, and Bulgarisants, are only some of the names that prove Greece's unpreparess in this mean falsification of the Macedonian people and language. There are also other Greek sources that contradict the previous numbers of the Macedonians in Greece. The Athenian newspaper, "Message d' Aten" wrote on February 15, 1913, that the number of "Bulgar-echarhists" was 199,590 contradicting with those 119,000 of the "Ethnic Map of Greek Macedonia".

How many Macedonians remained in Greece?

When the Bulgarian and Serbian views are added, the confusion gets only bigger. According to the Bulgarian Rumenov, in 1928 there were total of 206,435 "Bulgarians", while the Serb Bora Milojevich claimed 250,000 "Slavs" in Aegean Macedonia. Belgrade's "Politika" in its 6164 issue of June 24, 1925 gave three times greater numbers for the Macedonians in Greece than official Athens:

"The Greek government must not complain that we are pointing to the fact that the Macedonian population of West Macedonia - 250,000 - 300,000 - is the most unfortunate national and linguistic minority in the world, not only because their personal safety in endangered, but also because they have no church nor school in their own language, and they had them during the Turkish rule."

The speculations with the real number of Macedonians is obvious again. Their true number remains disputable in the Balkan documents, same as it was the case before the partition of 1912. Unfortunately, the Greek government would not allow anybody, including neutral observers to conduct statistical studies. Forced to leave, the Macedonians emigrated in large numbers to Australia, Canada, and the USA. As a result, there are about 300,000 Macedonians that presently live in Australia. In the city of Toronto, Canada, there are about 100,000. The present Macedonian colonies in these counties are represented mostly by the descendants of those Aegean Macedonians who settled there in the 1920's.

According to the "Ethnic Map of Greek Macedonia Showing the Ratio Between Various Ethnic Elements in 1912 and 1926", only 42,000 left their homes. If we take the statistical tables of the Balkan and neutral sources above, by 1913 in the whole of Macedonia lived around 1,250,000 Macedonians. In the Aegean part (51%) which Greece took after 1913, half of the Macedonian nation remained under Greek rule - that would be 625,000 people. If up to 1926 42,000 out of these 625,000 left, in the Greek part of Macedonian thereafter remained 583,000 Macedonians.

Recognition of the Macedonian Language by Greece

After World War I and under the international law, Greece signed the agreement to provide education in the languages of the minorities that remained in its borders. As a result, Sakerlarou Press in Athens printed a primer in the Macedonian language called "Abecedar" in 1924. It was intended for the Macedonian children in the soon to be opened new schools and it was a clear recognition of the existence of the Macedonians in Greece. The Greek government, however, later changed its position and the primer never reached the schools.

The Macedonian Language Forbidden in Greece

The Englishmen B. Hild who traveled through Aegean Macedonia in 1928 has recorded that the Greeks are chasing not only the alive Macedonians, to whom they sometimes refer to as "bulgarophones" and sometimes as "slavophones", but also the graves of dead Macedonians, by destroying all non-Greek signs on the crosses. The use of the Macedonian language was forbidden and punishable when dictator Metaxis gained power in Greece. Between 1936 and 1940, some 5,250 Macedonians were persecuted for speaking their native language. The official order of the National Garde in Nered (Polipotamos):

"All residents from two to fifty years of age are forbidden to use any other language but Greek. I direct special attention to the youth. Anyone to break this law will be punished."

But as the facts point out, the Macedonians were not wiped out from Aegean Macedonia in spite of the many assimilation attempts by the Greek government. One such fact is the ethnic map of Europe in The Times Atlas of World History, where the Macedonians presented as separate nationality cover the territory of complete Macedonia, including Aegean Macedonia in Greece.

Here is another map, part of a larger Balkan map and made by German ethnographers, first published after World War I, which proves that the ethnic Macedonians are the majority in Aegean Macedonia while the Greeks consist only a small minority.

The Macedonians on this map (Mazedonier in German, and presented in green with stripes), populate the largest area of Aegean Macedonia, including the cities of Kostur (Kastoria), Lerin (Florina), Voden (Edessa), Ber (Veroia), and Salonika (Thessaloniki), the largest Macedonian city. This map is yet another clear proof that the Macedonians do exist as large minority in Greece. It is also very important to note, that southernmost river in Macedonia which many ethnographers consider to be Macedonia's border with Greece, is labeled on this map with the native Macedonian name Wistritza (Bistrica). However, Greek maps that date after the partition of Macedonia, have changed this name with the Greek Aliakmon. Another examples on wiping off the native Macedonian names from this map, would also be the second largest city in Aegean Macedonia, Serres which Greece changed to Serrai later, the river Mesta which was changed to Nestos, or the lake Beschik which today appears as Volvi.

The CIA Ethnic Map of Balkans and Macedonia is yet another proof that the ethnic Macedonians today represent a big national minority in northern Greece or Aegean Macedonia. According to this CIA source, the Macedonians live in all parts of Macedonia: today's Republic of Macedonia, Pirin Macedonia in Bulgaria, and Aegean Macedonia in Greece.

Macedonians Oppressed in Greece

Following are several documents regarding the oppression of the Macedonians in Aegean Macedonia before the World War II. They appeared in "Rizospastis", a newspaper published by the Greek Communist Party (KKE).

April 15, 1934

Serres (Serrai). The town square was covered with leaflets with revolutionary proclamations calling upon the soldiers to straggle for a solution to their problems and against the beastly reign of terror. Officers imprisoned the soldiers who read the leaflets... The most barbarous methods were used against us Macedonians, soldiers of the 6th Heavy Artillery Regiment. The majority of us are illiterate, we do not know Greek and therefore we frequently do not understand their orders. The officers tried to teach us to read and write, but their efforts were abandoned too soon and were performed so improperly than none of us learned anything.

June 6, 1934

Voden (Edessa). Here, in Voden, and in our whole district, in the heart of Macedonia, here where we Macedonians do not know any other language but our own Macedonian, various agents of the Greek capitalism fore us to speak Greek. Consequently, they threaten us constantly with expulsion to Bulgaria, they call us Komitajis, expropriate our fields which we have drenched with our sweet just to produce a piece of bread. In addition, they deprive us of the freedom which our fathers won after many years of struggle in which they gave their lives for the liberation of Macedonia. We live under the yoke of Greek capitalism, literally as slaves. In the elementary schools, the young children who speak their own language are beaten every day. Particularly here in Voden, the henchman and fascist Georgiadis beats the children if they speak their Macedonian tongue.

June 8, 1934

Lerin (Florina). It has been some time now that the whole bourgeois press launched a campaign against the Macedonian people. It represents a part of the fascist and military measures which the Government of Tsaldaris carries out in its orientation towards an increasingly brutal oppression of the people's masses in Macedonia. The Chief of the Security Forces here, Karamaunas, whenever he meets us on the streets threatens us with the words: "You are Bulgarians and if by any chance I discover any sort of organized movement, I will beat you without mercy and than I will deport you." We Macedonians should rise with greater courage and by means of increased activities should reject this campaign because it brings us an even more brutal oppression, starvation, misery, and war.

MACEDONIA AND GREECE AFTER WORLD WAR II

The end of World War II brought both joy and sadness to the Macedonian people. Joy because the Macedonians were finally recognized as a distinct people with their own nationality, language, and culture in Yugoslavia. The Republic of Macedonia was not anymore "Southern Serbia" but an integral part of federal Yugoslavia. The possible unification of all three parts of Macedonia failed however as Great Britain intervened and blocked that idea, afraid that the Macedonian unification will endanger her interests on the Balkan peninsula.

The Greek Civil War

During the Greek Civil War that followed World War II, the Macedonians of Aegean Macedonia fought on the side of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) who promised them their rights after the war. After two years of KKE's success in the civil war, the United States decided to side up against them, afraid that Greece would become another communist country. With the military support that came from the United States and Great Britain, the communists lost the war, and the Macedonians once again did not get their human rights.

The Yugoslav - Greek Relations

In the years following the war, Yugoslavia urged Greece many times to recognize the Macedonian minority in Aegean Macedonia. The Greek paper "Elefteros Tipos" wrote that in September of 1986 the Prime-Minister Papandreu in the talks with Yugoslav presidency member Stane Dolanc has agreed to recognize the Macedonian language as one of the official languages in Yugoslavia. As a result of those talks, on March 16, 1988, the Greek Prime-Minister Papandreu and the Foreign Affairs' Karolos Papulias, even agreed to recognize the Macedonian language in Greece. However, the bankers affair "Koskotas" emerged, the PASOK government fell, and the documents were never signed. Greece continued to refer to the Macedonians as "Slavophones" who speak an idiom.

THE MACEDONIAN - GREEK RELATIONS

When the Republic of Macedonia seceded from Yugoslavia and became independent in 1991, Greece urged the world not to recognize Macedonia under that name because Macedonia's Constitution "threatens the security and integrity of Greece". What Greece is referring to is the Article 49 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia which states:

"The Republic of Macedonia cares for the statue and rights of those persons belonging to the Macedonian people in neighboring countries, as well as Macedonian ex-parties, assists their cultural development and promotes links with them."

Athens sees Article 49 to be a direct threat for the security of Greece because Macedonia cares for the people in Greece who consider themselves Macedonians? How can a country of two million be a danger to Greece's ten million? Furthermore, Greece has also similar article in her Constitution, as any other country in the world, to care for her minorities in the neighboring countries. Should Albania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, urge the world not to recognize Greece because of her Constitution to care for her minorities in these neighboring countries? What Greece is doing is against the international law. Greece demands that Macedonia change its Constitution because there are "no Macedonian people" in Greece but this will be proven to be a lie once again, when Human Rights Watch / Helsinki, visited Aegean Macedonia in 1994.

Violation of the Human Rights of the Macedonians in Greece

The 80-page human rights violation report on Greece entitled "Denying Ethnic Identity - Macedonians of Greece" was published in May 1994. After visiting Aegean Macedonia, The Human Rights Watch/Helsinki concluded:

"Although ethnic Macedonians in northern Greece make up large minority with their own language and culture, their internationally recognized human rights and even their existence are vigorously denied by the Greek government. Free expression is restricted; several Macedonians have been persecuted and convicted for their peaceful expression of their views. Moreover, ethnic Macedonians are discriminated against by the government's failure to permit the teaching of the Macedonian language. And ethnic Macedonians, particularly rights activists, are harassed by the government - followed and threatened by the security forces - and subjected to economic and social pressure resulting from this harassment. All of these actions have led to a marked climate of fear in which a large number of ethnic Macedonians are reluctant to assert their Macedonian identity or to express their views openly. Ultimately, the government is pursuing every avenue to deny the Macedonians of Greece their ethnic identity."

The Helsinki Watch has, therefore, proven that there is nothing wrong with the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. The Macedonians indeed exist in Greece as a large minority and, therefore, Macedonia has the full right to care for them. Helsinki Watch found the Greek government guilty for oppressing the Macedonian minority and demanded they be given their basic human rights to which they are entitled to. Another human rights organization, Amnesty International, also urged the Greek government to respect the human rights of the ethnic Macedonians. The European Union has furthermore recognized the Macedonian language as one of the languages spoken within the EU borders. The Republic of Macedonia is not a member of the European Union, but Aegean Macedonia in Greece, is within those borders.

The Greek Embargo

Greece slapped a trade embargo on Macedonia because of the refusal of the Macedonian President Gligorov to rename the country, nation, and language, and change the constitution.The embargo had devastating impact on Macedonia's economy. Macedonia was cut-off from the port of Salonika and became landlocked because of the UN embargo on Yugoslavia to the north, and the Greek embargo to the south. Greece said it will remove the embargo only if Macedonia satisfies her demands. This blackmail was not acceptable to the Republic of Macedonia which considered the embargo illegal. At the same time, Greece withdrew from the Greek - Macedonian talks, monitored by the UN as a mediator, and blocked any acceptance of Macedonia in the international institutions by using its power to veto new members.

CONCLUSION

The claims put forward by Greece that the ancient Macedonians were Greeks, that their native language was Greek, and that Macedonia had always been a region of Greece are all false. The historical truth is that Greece was inhabited by ancient Greeks, Macedonia by ancient Macedonians. Today, it is the modern Greeks and the modern Macedonians to occupy those lands. It is a total absurdity to hear the Greeks of today to claim they are the Macedonians, the Greek Macedonians, the only and true Macedonians. How can they be "the only and true Macedonians", when today's Greek population of Aegean Macedonia immigrated there just 80 years ago joining that small Greek minority of 10%? How can they overlook the atrocities they committed on the people who than, as centuries before, proudly called themselves Macedonians? What about the statistics and maps made by neutral and independent ethnographers, slavists, and writers, to prove the existence of the Macedonian nation? And finally, what about the ethnic Macedonians whose discrimination by the official Greek government was witnessed by the independent Human Rights Watch / Helsinki and Amnesty International in 1994?

The existence of the Macedonian nation and the ethnic Macedonian minority in Greece can not be questioned. There is, however, a great deal of irony surrounding the issue. In spite of the truth about Macedonia and the Macedonians, many Western countries have not yet recognized the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name but under the reference "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia". This includes the United States which after the recognition, did not send an ambassador to Skopje for more than a year. Interestingly enough, this "freeze" coincides with the visit of the most powerful representatives of the Greek-American lobby to President Clinton in the White House, behind closed doors, and in the presence of Clinton's adviser George Stefanopoulos, who himself, is a Greek-American.

How it is possible that the Western countries have chosen to follow "democratic" Greece where lies prevail over the truth? The European Court found the Greek embargo illegal and put Greece on trial, but did nothing to stop it while it was so harmful to the Macedonian economy. They never cared about the rights of the Macedonians in Greece while the Macedonians of the Aegean are still facing daily oppression and persecution. Finally, they still play that game for the Macedonia's name, the way Greece wants them to. Yes, this is yet anotherproof that interests are stronger than the truth. Greece is a member of the European Union, NATO, an important ally that occupies a very strategic position. On the other hand, all other countries that do not belong to those organizations have recognized Macedonia under its constitutional name. Russia and China are among those countries. The question now is if the West is willing to risk losing Greece for the small landlocked Macedonia? But by standing silent on the issue, they are taking an active role in Greece's politics.

Yet, on every atlas (like National Geographic), encyclopedia (like Britannica), newspaper (like New York Times), and TV media (like CNN), Macedonia is referred simply as Macedonia. Even the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and Defense Secretary William Perry, speak of Macedonians and refer to Macedonia as Macedonia. Matthew Nimitz, the US mediator in the Greek - Macedonian talks has said that "the country has an Constitutional name - Republic of Macedonia" and that besides the opposing of Greece, Macedonia was admitted at UN under the reference "former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", but that is "only a reference and not name". The truth about Macedonia slowly but surely is coming to the top, working towards a final end to the century-old shadow of Greek lies and propaganda. That is until the change of the Balkan policies and interests might push it all back to where it started. But regardless of everything, the Macedonians continue to exits on every part of divided Macedonia - the Republic of Macedonia, and the Macedonian parts which are today held by Greece and Bulgaria. They have survived as Macedonians for almost 3,000 years and nobody by renaming them will change the fact that they are and will remain Macedonians.

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